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ABSTRACT
The phrase a 'culture of silence' is attributed to Jerry Rawlings in the late 1980s, at a
time when he was military head of state in Ghana. The irony is that he appeared to be
complaining about the 'culture of silence' created by his own military regime. In a
'culture of silence' the masses are mute, that is, they are prohibited from taking part in
the transformation of their society. In a neo-colonial state, a 'culture of silence' is
imposed on the masses and peace and order are guaranteed by ferocious repression.
The basic premise that motivates this research is that the neo-colonial state, a by-
product of the colonial state was influential in imposing the 'culture of silence' and
fear in the lives of ordinary people. As such, a defining feature of the neo-colonial
state, it is argued, is a 'culture of silence'. Definitions and analysis of the neo-
colonial state follow lines of arguments put forward by African writers such as Claude
Ake, Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Mahmood Mamdani. Within this broad paradigm of
neo-colonialism, and analysis of Banda's Malawi is developed which pays particular
attention to a 'culture of silence'. This in turn leads to an examination of the effect of
liberalization on political and civic space in Malawi.
The dissertation then, examines civil society activities, during the period of transition
of the Malawian state from de jure one-party to de jure multiparty. Here the key
research question are: to what extent has an expansion of political space been
accompanied by an expansion of civic space, and how, if at all, do civil society
organizations ensure that government pays attention to the diversity of voices of the
Malawian people? Are traditionally marginalized voices now heard? The objective is
to examine to what extent the 'culture of silence' has been dismantled in terms of the
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A 'culture of silence' emerges in a society due to the authoritarian tendencies of the
state. In Africa, the emergence of a 'culture of silence' typically occurs in the neo-
colonial state. Malawi under the Banda regime arguably is emblematic of the neo-
colonial genre. Economi(and politicallit:eralization create a window of opportunity,
not least through a Bill of Rights protected by an independent judiciary, for an
opening up of civic space, enabling a 'clamour of voices' to be heard.
2 Research Problem
By taking Malawi as emblematic of on-going transitions from neo-colonialism in
Africa today, and by interrogating selected aspects of civil society discourse and
activities in today's Malawi, this dissertation aims to isolate and outline some of the
areas of change as well as of continuity in the transition from neo-colonialism. The
research problem therefore, is to uncover elements of meaningful change or otherwise
as revealed by a process of qualitative research. Thus, the research methodology is
J
twofold: (a) theoretical and analytical and (b) empirical and interrogatory. For both
sections, neo-colonialism and legacies of neo-colonialism are deployed in the
organizational framework.
3 Political context of the research
Particularly in the last decade, academic discourse about 'civil society' and
'democracy' has stimulated much research and lively debates within and across
academic di'sciplines. "For many scholars and donors, civil society is an instrument,
perhaps the most important one, which will make states more democratic, more
transparent and more accountable". I As the quotation indicates, discourse about
democracy and civil society tends to regard the two concepts as intertwined. It is
therefore not surprising that democratisation initiatives in Africa would bring with
l Kasfir, N. (ed) (1998) Civil Society and Democracy in Africa. London: Frank Cass, p.l.
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them a renewed interest in civil society activities. Generally, civil society is deemed a
central tenet of the 'broader democracy project' and runs parallel with calls and
campaigns for greater accountability and transparency form the public sector.
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In addition, when considering democratisation in African states, the pressure from
foreign donors cannot be ignored. By the end of the 1980s Africa's military and
single party regimes were looking increasingly antiquated in the light of changes
elsewhere in the world, for example, the democratising initiatives that took place in
Latin America, and Asia. The international financial institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to insist that aid and investment had
to be linked to political reform. Thus, around the end of the 1980s political
conditionality was added to the economic conditionality that had emerged around a
decade earlier.3 In retrospect, these external influences were very important in laying
the groundwork for formal democracy. However, "it was often the resourcefulness,
dedication, and tenacity of the continent's nascent civil societies that initiated and
sustained the process of democratic opening and politicalliberalization".4
4 Concepts, methodologies and sources
Two broad concepts are utilized in this dissertation. The first is the concept of neo-
colonialism. The second is the concept of civil society. The former informs the
research in section one of this dissertation. The latter concept informs section two.
However, of these two concepts, neo-colonialism is given primacy. This is because
civil society in Malawi is perceived as emergent, that is, emerging from an era of neo-
colonialism. It has therefore not coalesced and consolidated its existence.
2 Kotze, H. Barbeton, C. & Blakc, M. (1998) Creating Action Space: The Challenge of Poverty and
Democracy in South Africa. IDASA: David Phillips Publishers, p.81.
3 Wiseman, J. (ed) (1995) Democracy and Political Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa. London:
Routledge, p.3.
4 Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1997) 'Civil Society in Africa: the good, the bad, the ugly', in
http://www.civnet.org/journal/issue l/egboadi. htmJ
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4.1 The neo-colonial paradigm
Nkrumah's paper 'Neo-colonialism in Africa' can be regarded as a starting point for
the discourse about neo-colonialism in Africa from the 1960s onwards. In this paper,
Nkrumah argued that independence from colonialism is not much more than
technical. Even though independent in name, "these countries continue the classical
relationship of a colonial economy to its metropolitan patron".5 In fact, the former
colonizing powers, international financial institutions, and superpowers such as the
United States moved covertly and manipulatively in creating client states whose
leaders in fact became pawns.6 These colonizing powers continued to exercise
decisive influence on the economics, policies, and educational and cultural institutions
of 'flag independence' African countries. Without the means to establish their own
political and economic autonomy, African states became dependent countries,
"compelled to continue within the old colonial framework".?
Nkrumah's argument has since been modified and extended by a variety of African
and Africanist scholars. Thus, literature and theoretical debates are extensive. This
dissertation privileges the work of respected and reputable African and Africanist
scholars such as Ake (1981) Ngugi (1998) and Mamdani (1996). It also draws on
general texts such as Chazan (1988), Chabal (1992) and Smith (1983) to name a few.
~
The method used is theoretical, analytical and comparative, that is, arguments are
summarized and compared in light of similarities and differences. Features common
to perceptions of neo-colonial states are then filtered and lifted. Banda's Malawi is
then discussed and examined according to the general listed themes. The same
method is method of analysis is applied. However, a major difference is that the
literature on neo-colonialism in Malawi is relatively thin as compared to the wealth of
literature on neo-colonialism in Africa. The former factor imposes limitations on
Malawian research. As such, some of the authors are frequently referred to. For
example, in this section, authors such as Williams (1978), Short (1974) and Phiri and
Ross (1998) are constantly cited.
5 Nkurmah, K. 'Neo-Colonialism in Africa', in Mutiso, G. & Rohio, S. (ed) (1975) Readings in African




In the second section, the concept of civil society is discussed with specific reference
to the arguments of Mamdani (1996), Monga (1996) and Chabal (1992). These works
were chosen because of the author's emphasis on the effects of neo-colonialism on an
emergent civil society. More specifically, utilizing Africanist perspectives of civil
society, certain characteristics are highlighted. Again, a theoretical, analytical and
comparative method is utilized.
This dissertation then shifts into empirical, qualitative research and data analysis.
This is conducted and based on the findings obtained from the three strata of civil
society in Malawi, namely, the religious community, women's organizations and the
academic community. The methods of inquiry are empirical and interrogative.
However, it must be noted that the choice to these three organizations was attendant
on time and access. This section thus tackles a variety of issues depending on the
specific nature and role of the organization within the Malawian context. In addition,
general themes are highlighted and discussed to discern common perceptions within
the Malawian context.
5 Chapter outline
In light of the above, the organizational framework of this dissertation begins by
utilizing modes of analysis that examine neo-colonialism in Africa. Included in the
first chapter are the impact and legacies of colonialism in order to illustrate a sense of
continuity by post-independence African leaders. General themes on neo-colonialism
are noted and lifted. These themes are then utilized to place the Malawian state in
comparative perspective, and in particular, within the neo-colonial framework of
analysis. This is the aim of chapter two. The third chapter examines the effects of
neo-colonialism on political and civic space. Particular attention is paid to the Banda
regime and how it systematically created a 'culture of silence'. Following from here,
chapter four discusses the concept of civil society and particular reference is paid to
the specific features of civil society in Africa. This chapter sets the scene for the
qualitative analysis that follows. Chapter five discusses the methods of qualitative
data analysis and explains why the three strata of civil society were chosen. Chapter
six thus examines the activities of civil society in Malawi and also highlights specific
4
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perceptions pertaining to the current context. Chapter seven provides the reader with




SECTION ONE: THE NEO-COLONIAL STATE IN AFRICA - A MALAWIAN
CASE STUDY
CHAPTER ONE: THE NEO-COLONIAL STATE
1.1 The concept of the State
The African continent is one which encompasses "a rich mosaic of peoples, cultures,
ecological settings and historical experiences. Therefore the political map of Africa
captures the complexity that is the essence of the continent".! In the first part of this
chapter I examine the basic concept of contemporary African politics: the state.
As Chazan et.a!. argue, "The concept of the state is inevitably elusive".2 However, they
point out that it is scarcely a new concept in political analysis in both Europe and Africa.
More importantly, growth in literature on the state in Africa began in the decade that
followed the first wave of independence. Indeed, during most of the 1960s, the African
state was virtually ignored. 3 However, in the following decade, scholars began to
examine the nature of the state in Africa. During this period, as Nyongo argues, "the
state was conceptualised (and rarified) as an instrument of capitalist exploitation".4
Samoff adds that the state from this point of view, "was seen as synonymous with the
ruling class, and special emphasis was placed on understanding the process of class
formation, its characteristics, and its implications".5 Neo-Marxists, on the other hand,
sought to "dissociate the state from the ruling class by pointing out that although there is
an affinity between the state and dominant groups, the two terms are hardly
coterminous".6 This was a marked departure from the latter definition. This shift in
emphasis sought to explain that although "state institutions may reflect and in fact even
I Chazan, N. & Mortimer, R. & Ravenhill, J. & Rothchild, D. (1988) Politics and Society in Contemporary
Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Lyrme Rienner Publishers, pA.
2 Ibid, p.36.
3 Ibid, p.36.
4 Anyang'Nyongo, P. (1983) cited in Chazan, N. et.al. (1988) op cif, p.37.
5 Samoff, 1. (1982) cited in Chazan, N. et. al. (1988) op cif, p.37.
6 Ake, C. (1981) A Political Economy of Africa. London: Longman, pp.126-127.
6
produce social forces and conflicts; they are however, quite clearly distinct empirically".?
Clearly from these two examples, Africanist scholars differed in their interpretations and
conceptualisations of the state in Africa. This ultimately depended upon the angle from
which they were viewing the state in Africa: namely, from the liberal perspective or the
Marxist-Leninist perspective. However, throughout the vast amount of literature that has
been generated, and depending on which side of the fence a scholar positioned him or
herself, there is substantial agreement on the general definition of the state. Generally
speaking, the state is seen as "the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions
of govemance".8 It is therefore portrayed and defined as "the apex of the political
system,,9 or as "an instrument of exercising power and control".1O It is also depicted as
an organ that comprises "autonomous bureaucratic apparatuses of domination endowed
with its material interests and political agendas".ll It is also argued that because the
bureaucratic apparatus of the state is endowed with such features (as mentioned above),
the ruling class therefore seek to dominate and control the state "through the creation and
implementation of binding rules,,12 in order to ensure their domination over other
institutions within the state. In short, the state, together with its bureaucratic apparatus,
comprises "decision making structures (executives, parties, parliaments), decision-
enforcing institutions (bureaucracies, parastatals, and security forces), and decision-
mediating bodies (primarily courts, tribunals, and investigatory committees)". 13 Indeed,
this is how most observers tended to characterize, describe and classify the post- colonial
state in Africa in its basic format. In the sphere of analysis, the functioning of state
institutions was the main focus of scholars in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, it was also during the decade of the late 1960s and 1970s that it dawned on
scholars that a much fuller explanation was needed. The need for a more holistic analysis
was a product of the socio-economic malaise in Africa which (analysts inferred) was
7 Chazan, N. et.a!. (1988) op cit, p.37.
8 Duvall, R. & Freeman, J. R. (1981) cited in Chazan, N. et.a!' (1988) op cit, p.37.
9 Chabal, P. (1992) Power in Africa. New York: St Martin's Press, p.70.
10 Chazan, N. et.al. (1988) op cit, p.37.
11 Fatton, R. (1992) Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, p.1.




reflective of endemic political problems. Therefore, understanding the root of this
problem required a deeper analysis of the state in Africa. From here, various modes of
analysis or approaches to analysing the post-independence state in Africa emerged. From
the various perspectives that emerged, it was clear that there was little consensus among
the proponents of each view. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I argue that there
is a distinction between the descriptive (post-colonial) and the normative (neo-colonial)
modes of analysis, as it is the latter that forms the conceptual basis of my thesis,
especially regarding state-society relations that emerged in Africa from approximately
1960 onwards.
1.2 The state of scholarship from 1960s onwards
It is arguable that the descriptive (post-colonial) and the normative (neo-colonial) modes
of analysis are divided into two main streams: Western empiricism (purportedly 'value-
free' and hence, descriptive), and the neo-Marxist dependency analysis (by definition,
anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, anti-bourgeoisie, and pro-workers and peasants, hence
implicitly value laden, even if it is called 'scientific'). Of these two dominant modes,
each served the epistemological positions of the Americans and Soviets respectively.
Each epistemology was narrowed down to hegemonic political ideologies: liberal
democracy of the West and Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet bloc. During the post-
independence decades, numerous academics descended on Africa, each armed with his or
her theories of development. 14 The theory and theme of American empiricism in
particular was modernization theory that was shaped to fit the perceived requirements of
'developing nations'. Dependency theory, on the other hand, was the neo-Marxist
answer to American modernization theory. In this sense, Africa became an ideological,
epistemological and methodological battleground between East and West. The term
'post-colonial' has tended to be used mainly by Western political analysts, arguably to
indicate a 'neutral' or descriptive mode. 'Neo-colonial' on the other hand, was used
largely by scholars like Claude Ake, Samir Amin and others working within the
14 See Staniland, M. (1991) American Intellectuals and African Nationalists, 1955 - 1970. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
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dependency school, to critique conversion of imperialism into neo-imperialism, and the
continuing exploitation of African resources and labour by developed nations. IS
The evolution of this battleground stemmed from the quest for spheres of influence:
namely, ideological, military and economic. One must remember that this period was
when the Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the West was underway. Furthermore,
these theories were based on the socio-economic malaise that bedevilled the continent.
For example, in economic terms, the performance of most African countries had fallen
far short of the vision of progress and well being anticipated by the leaders of anti-
colonial movements. In addition, internal conflicts weighed heavily on the capacity of
states to peacefully govern themselves and achieve some level of economic prosperity.
But most importantly, many African leaders in an effort to gain total control, centralized
power by establishing one-party states that attempted to control all facets of people's
lives - that is the social, political and economic. 16 In military dictatorships any
expression of dissatisfaction towards government was likely to meet with heavy
penalties. 17 This ultimately led to the muting of opposition forces and an intolerance of
dissenting OpIniOns. This suppression of dissenting views thus altered state-society
relations. The literature increasingly characterized the African state as statist and
authoritarian. In some cases, leaders of post-independence states began to operate in a
similar manner to that of their colonial predecessors. 18 Therefore, it is arguable that the
term 'post-colonial' was coined in acknowledgment of the extent to which African states
were still shaped by their colonial inheritances. It is also arguable that many of Africa's
problems were deepened and extended by Cold War competition, which resulted in
financial aid for African dictators, irrespective of ethical considerations. It is against this
background that modernization and dependency theories should be reviewed.
15 See, Ake, C. (1981) op cit. Also see Amin, S. (1976) Unequal Development. Sussex: Harvest Press.
16 Examples of states that replaced multi-party with one-party constitutions during the 1960s and 1970s are:
Kenya, Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia and Malawi.
17 Examples of states that became military dictatorships (no-party states) in the same period are: Nigeria,
Niger, Libya, Ghana and Burkina Faso.
18 Examples of personalized authoritarian leadership following in colonial footsteps are: Mobutu Sese Seko




Modernization theory "emanated from the West and was closely related to developments
in United States political science in the 1950s".19 The representatives of this discourse
claimed to put the 'science' into political science, and engaged with newly independent
African states as scholars and consultants. "Early studies conducted on African politics
were mostly written from a modernization perspective, or political development
perspective".2o Its analysts assumed that a focus on transformation from traditional to
modem environments would lead to a generalizable theory of development, and in
addition, put an end to Africa's woes. Modernization theory was captured in two
processes: economic and political. Underlying these processes was the basic premise that
purported: if Africa followed a particular path of development it would be able to catch
up to the West through "rapid industrialization, increased economic activity and
interaction, what would be achieved is an acceleration of growth,,21 that would benefit the
state and "establish procedures for equitable resource allocation".22 In political terms,
modernization implied institutional expansion, the rationalization of government
apparatus, power concentration, some measure of political participation, and an
augmentation of capacities in order to meet growing demands?3 Through this prescribed
model of development, the modernization theorists attempted to construct 'value-free'
depictions of the modus operandi of African states in the late 1960s and 1970s.
However, Western empiricist conceptions of development were not to go unchallenged.
In the 1970s and 1980s, a new school of thought, neo-Marxist
dependency/underdevelopment theory came into vogue and sought to challenge Western
empiricism. This group of scholars operated on the opposite assumption that African
progress was being impeded by forces (international and domestic), bent on exploiting
the continent's resources?4 This school of thought used Lenin's theory of imperialism as
its baseline, and argued that the West, by peddling capitalism and liberalism, had altered
the structural relationship between the First World and the Third World, and therefore
19 Chazan, N. et.a/. (1988) op cit, p.14.
20 Ibid.
~~ Rist, G. (1997) The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. London: Zed, p.78.
Chazan, N. et.a/. (1988) op cit, p.14.
23 Higgot, R. A. (1983) cited in Chazan, N. et. al. (1988) op cit, p.14.
24 See Chazan, N. et. a/. (1988) op cit, p.16.
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had given rise to the incapacitating syndrome of dependency. Likewise, they argued that
chronic problems of underdevelopment and poverty in African states largely were the
consequences of Western neo-imperialism. Mamdani in his critique of modernization
theory succinctly summarises the emergence of dependency theory.
Dependency theory emerged as a powerful critique of various forms of unilinear
evolutionism. It rejected both the claim that the less developed countries were
traditional societies in need of modernization and the conviction that they were
backward pre-capitalist societies on the threshold of a much-needed bourgeois
revolution.25
Bayart offers us a different perspective on the origins of the dependency school of
thought. He in a sense opposes the theory's application to Africa.
The dependency school, originated in the observation of Latin American
economic patterns. Its application to Africa gave rise to an increase in dogma
and hypocrisy rather than to a careful study of political dynamics.26
Mamdani's critique of certain trends in dependency theory gives a more precisely argued
picture than Bayart's. He argues, "alongside modernization theory and orthodox
Marxism, it came to view social reality through a series of binary opposites".27 These
opposites, such as developed/underdeveloped; capitalist/pre-capitalist, arguably are
predicated on the defining dichotomies of the Cold War: West/East;
capitalist/communist. In this argument, it is apparent that the history of African states
between 1960 and 1989 was a peripheral reflection of Cold War at the centre. This
reflection is itself rooted in imperialism. Colonial rule, by extending capitalism to their
colonies or protectorates, "created some fundamental affinities between the African
economy and that of the colonizing power".28 Thus, colonial rule, whilst integrating
African economies into the world's capitalist system simultaneously "promoted
complimentary or interdependence, albeit unequal interdependence between the African
economies and the metropolitan economies".29 Another prominent scholar, Immanuel
Wallerstein, allied himself with the dependency school, but in doing so, transferred his
25 Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.9.
~~ Bayart, J: F. (1992) 'Civil Society in Africa'. Journal ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2, p.60.
Mamdam, M. (1996) op cit, p.9.
28 Ake, C. (1981) op cit, p.36.
29 Ibid, p.36.
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interest in the analysis of post-colonial regimes to an analysis of the world system.30 He
argued "one of the characteristics of a peripheral zone is that the indigenous system is
weak, moving from its non-existence (i.e., from its colonial existence) to a state with
weak autonomy (i.e., a neo-colonial situation).,,3]
Whereas modernization theorists perceived the state as an instrument of power and
control, dependency theorists acknowledged the influence of society - but only in tenns
of state generated systems of class differentiation and class struggle. Hence, in the final
analysis, both schools saw the state as the key factor in analysis. However, from
approximately the mid-1980s onwards, Western analysis widened to include African
societies within its conceptual framework. As Chazan puts it:
By the late 1970s, therefore, both Marxists and Liberal researchers, working from
parallel, albeit inverted, paradigms, made an attempt to reorient their work so that
it could focus more squarely on specific processes occurring in Africa. 32
Chazan explains that this was called the statist approach to the study of African politics.
Political analysts working within this framework "sought to uncover the characteristics of
the African states in the independence periods".33 This included looking into patterns of
governance, leadership styles and issues such as patrimonialism, nepotism and
corruption. During the 1980s, writers focused their research on state-society interactions.
However, in the mid to late 1980s, the paradigmatic shifts in global intellectual discourse
due to the demise of the Communist bloc, saw the privileging of civil society in African
studies.
The privileging of civil society coincided with a nonnative trend in Western scholarship
attendant on the collapse of Soviet style communism, which was seen as a revolution
from below, powered by influential social movements in Eastern Europe. This paradigm
of civil society in opposition to an authoritarian and corrupt state was transferred to
Africa and utilized to explain the activities of social movements in the 1990s, and the
demand for constitutional refonn and multi-party elections. Western scholars, donor
30 Bayart, 1. F. (1992) op cit, p.62.
31 Wallerstein, I. (1950) cited in Bayart, 1. F. (1992) op cit, p.63.
32 Chazan, N. et.a!. (1988) op cit, p.19.
33 Ibid, p.19.
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countries and international financial institutions distinguished between liberalizing states
(the 'good') and unreformed authoritarian states (the 'bad). In the decade after 1989, and
attendant on the 'triumph of the West', much Western discourse about Africa was highly
normative, and Western aid was tied in with the state's willingness to democratise.
What of neo-Marxist dependency discourse and the neo-colonial state? The end of the
Cold War on Western terms had an inevitable effect of neo-Marxist scholarship.
However, in Africa at least, the need to resist neo-liberalism and the worst effects of
structural adjustment programs, particularly on disadvantaged sectors of the population,
continues to be reflected in the (post-Marxist) literature. In many respects,
'democratisation' is seen as superficial, especially when incumbent parties and presidents
have rigged elections and used their economic muscle to get themselves returned to
power, and where political space is still largely restricted to the governing party, (that is,
where opposition parties are weak, divided and lacking funding) and where civic space is
still endangered and somewhat silent. Here, the neo-colonial paradigm continues to be
applied, for instance, in the analyses of Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Claude Ake, published
since 1989. Also, Mamdani has made valuable contributions to post-Cold War analyses
of politics in Africa in which he uses the concepts 'post-colonial' and 'neo-colonial'
interchangeably.34
Since 1989, African novelists, playwrights, literary critics and philosophers such as
Appiah, Achebe, Soyinka, Quayson and Mapanje have defined and described a post-
colonial condition closely tied in with state violence, authoritarianism, oppression and the
silencing of civic voices and dissent. For example, Mapanje commenting on the
oppressive and repressive apparatuses of post-colonial states in order to silence dissent
argues that "censorship ultimately protects African leadership against the truth". He
further argues, "The situation has become so serious that writers, scholars and others
must in their role as defenders of truth, must take stem measures to counteract this
34 See Ake, 'Democratization and Disempowerment' in Hippler, 1. (ed) (1995) The Democratisation of
Disempowerment. London: Pluto Press. See Thiong'o, N. (1997) Writers in Politics. Oxford: lames
Currey. See, wa Thiong'o, N. (1998) Penpoints, Gunpoints and Dreams. Oxford: Claredon Press. See
Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: The Comtemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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development".35 His position is in line with Ngugi wa Thiong'o who argues that the
artist and the intellectual cannot be divorced from politics. He writes: "Often the writer
and the politician have been the same person. In the very process of articulating the
people's collective consciousness the writer is led into active political struggles".36 Like
Mapanje, Ngugi argues that it is the duty of the writer to empower the people by making
them aware of the political situation within their respective countries. In general, African
scholars today use the term 'neo-colonial' to denote an era of oppression and suffering,
and a 'culture of silence' which is by no means over. The concept is a useful instrument
for reasoned, critical analysis, which, however, cannot be divorced from its normative
content. Nor should it be, I believe. To apply so-called neutral, 'value-free', strictly
descriptive analysis to an Africa wracked by poverty, disease and non-revolutionary
violence3? is to insult the humanity of Africans! For this reason, among others, this
dissertation gives priority to the term 'neo-colonial'. In addition, the dissertation includes
the impact and legacies of colonialism as explanatory factors for the complexity of
problems and dilemmas facing post-independence Africa.
Many political analysts have explored the impact of colonialism in Africa. I will refer to
some of the core themes raised by a selection of writers in order to lay the groundwork
for a contextual understanding of African states in general. Once the general themes
have been noted, my aim is to place the Malawian state in comparative African
perspective, and in particular, within a neo-colonial framework of analysis as this
paradigm is best suited for analysis of Malawi.
1.3 From colonial to neo-colonial
35 Mapanje, J. 'Prison as Exile/Exile as Prison', in Anyidoho, K. (ed) (1997) The Word Behind Bars and
the Paradox of Exile. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, ppA-5.
36 wa Thiong'o, N. (1997) Writers in Politics. Oxford: James Currey, p.69.
37 Mamdani, M. (2001) Making Sense of Non-Revolutionary Violence: Some Lessons from the Rwandan
Genocide. The Annual Frantz Fanon Lecture, University of Durban-Westville, 8 August, pp.I-17.
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Commenting on the political colonization of Africa, Smith notes: "Trading missions and
interests often paved the way for such annexations".38 This, he argues, was part and
parcel of the wider process of creating European territories. However, the particular
annexations in overseas territories, the whole process of European colonial expansion,
and its central product, the colonial state, cannot be explained in purely economic
terms.39 Other factors need to be incorporated into the broad scheme of annexation.
To begin with, it is important to differentiate between the two concepts 'imperialism' and
'colonialism'. Smith aptly highlights that:
It is perhaps worth recalling that the terms 'colonialism' and 'imperialism'
signified political principles and structures. Imperialism referred to the
unprincipled acquisition of territories overseas, usually by force of arms.
Colonialism, in turn, denoted a system of legislation in a different and politically
dependent territory, with its mainly European features adapted to local
conditions.4o
It is the latter concept that this section examines. As noted earlier, the impact of
colonialism in Africa lays the groundwork for understanding the contemporary African
state. For instance, Mamdani argues that all states in Africa looked alike and "their
structures everywhere shared certain fundamental features".41 However, it is important to
note that their genesis differed and it is therefore important to assess the impact of
colonial rule and how it may have contributed to the process of state formation in Africa,
as well as to trace the common features of colonialism.
To begin with, perhaps the most common feature of all colonial systems was the way in
which Europe went about defining its territories. European powers carved up a map of
Africa without regard for the integrity of existing cultural groups, ethnic, linguistic and
religious identities and state systems. The lines of demarcation were, as often as not,
drawn so that ethnic communities were divided up between different colonial units.42 As
:: S~th, A. D. (1983) State and Nation in the Third World. Great Britain: St Edmundsbury Press, p.25.
SmIth, A. D. (1983) op cif, p.25.
40 Ibid, p.26.
41 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.16.
42 Smith, A. D. (1983) op cif, p.27.
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a result, some large ethnic groups were split between colonial states. Chazan contributes
to this theme by stating that: "The new boundaries not only divided existing political
entities but more significantly, frequently compelled groups that had no history of
ongoing ties to relate to each other".43 Maxwell Owusu echoes Chazan's analysis in his
depiction of Europe's 'scramble for Africa'. "Colonial boundaries were arbitrarily
drawn, often splitting up communities, families, ethnic groups and cultural units, thereby
either destroying or undermining many indigenous structures and institutions of
authority".44
Another enduring problematic brought to Africa by imperialism is the means by which
colonial administrations attempted to ensure the subordination of colonial peoples by
whom they were vastly out-numbered. Two broad forms of rule were imposed: direct
rule or indirect rule depending on whether the colony was a settler colony or a
protectorate. Direct rule was Europe's initial response to the problem of administering
colonies. Under direct rule:
There would be a single legal order, defined by the 'civilized' laws of Europe.
No 'native' institutions would be recognized. 'Natives' would have
to conform to European laws and only those 'civilized' would have access to
European rights. Civil society, in this sense, was presumed to be civilized
society, from whose ranks the 'uncivilized' were excluded. For the vast
majority of 'natives', that is, for those 'uncivilized' direct rule signified an
unrnediated-centralized-despotism.45
In contrast, indirect rule came to be the mode of domination over a 'free' peasantry.
Under indirect rule:
Peasant communities were reproduced in the context of a spatial institutional
autonomy. The 'tribal' leadership was either selectively reconstituted as the
hierarchy of the local state or freshly imposed where none had existed. Here
political inequality went alongside civil inequality. Both were grounded in a legal
dualism. Alongside received law was implemented customary law that regulated
non-market relations. For the subject population of 'natives', indirect rule
signified a mediated-decentralized-despotism.46
43 Chazan, N. et.a!' (1988) op cif, p.13.
44 Owusu, M. 'Democracy in Africa: A View from the Village', in Nyang'oro, 1. E. (ed) (1996) Discourses
?,n Democr~cy: Africa in Comparative Perspective. Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, p. 277.
Mamdam, M. (1996) op cif, p.16-17.
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In sum, Mamdani argues that the colonial state in Africa was "Janus-faced, bifurcated. It
contained two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority".47 The type of state
that was created therefore depended essentially on the nature and objectives of the
colonialists. Part of their state structuring was adopted from the metropolitan country,
and the other from the traditional practices of the indigenous population.
48 In Mamdani's
analysis of the colonial state in Africa, is a depiction of a legal and political
superstructure constructed and invented to control and manage colonial territories
acquired through conquest. An authoritarian state is suspended above the people it
controls and manages.
Another common feature of all colonial administrations was the overarching authority of
a governor. Smith points out that, "colonialism operated essentially on the gubernatorial
principle: a governor, appointed by the metropolitan political authorities, was vested with
supreme powers in the colony and represented the colony to the metropolitan".49 In other
words, although the colonial state had local bureaucratic structures, it answered to, and
often acted under the direct orders from the metropolitan centre. In such a system,
bureaucratic machinery was the main agent of government and the chief instigator of
social, political and economic policies. Furthermore, the bureaucratic apparatus of the
colonial state was infused with the authoritarian power of the governor. As Gann and
Duignan conclude, "colonial empires had set an example of authoritarian government". 50
Furthermore, to this model of authoritarian power and privilege must be added the
precedent of violence and repression set by the colonial state. Crowder points out that
"the colonial state was conceived in violence rather than by negotiation, and it was
maintained by the free use of it".51 Mamdani reinforces this point: "colonial rule was
46 Ibid, p.17.
47 Ibid, p.18.
48 Schraeder, P. J. 'Political Elites and the Process of Democratisation in Africa', in Hipp1er, J. (ed) (1995)
The Democratisation of Disempowerrnent. London: P1uto Press, p.46.
49 Smith, A. D. (1983) op cit, pp.27-28.
50 Gann, L. H. & Duignan, P. (1982) cited in Diamond, L. et.a!. (1988) Democracy in Developing
Countries: Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, p.7.
51 Crowder, M (1987) cited in Diamond, L. et.a!. (1988) op cit, p.7.
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enforced with a whip, by a constellation of customary authorities - and, if necessary, with
the barrel of a gun, by the forces of the central state".52 Mamdani's analysis of violence,
like many others, is indebted to Franz Fanon's. In highlighting the inherent violence of
the colonial state, Fanon argues that: "Their (the indigenous population) first encounter
was marked by violence and their existence together - that is to say the exploitation of
the native by the settler - was carried on by dint of a great array of bayonets and
cannons".53 Colonizers free use of violence and coercion was the feature that gave
colonial rule the systemic qualities it possessed.54 Resistance and protest were always
forcibly and bloodily repressed and, in retrospect, "colonial rulers set the precedent of
dealing with opponents by jailing or exiling them".55
From the combination of systemic violence and state bureaucracy suspended above the
people, another feature emerges which is common to all colonial states. As Smith puts it,
colonial social relationships tended to mirror this split between state and society, creating
for the most part a kind of 'parallel society' in which the social structures formed by the
administrative apparatus were superimposed upon those of the subordinate population.56
As Fanon described it: "The colonial world is a world cut in two. The zone where the
natives live is not complimentary to the zone inhabited by settlers".57 The lines drawn
between these two compartments of social existence are not only the produces of racist
ideologies, but also mark the differences in lifestyles. Thus, argues Fanon, "in the
colonies the economic structure is also the superstructure".58 The zone inhabited by the
settlers is markedly different to the zone inhabited by the indigenous people. In the
former, there is there is good security, clean streets, paved roads, good sanitation and
spaciousness. In the latter, there is hunger, disease, poor sanitation, crime, violence and
poverty.59 This kind of separation arguably has a psychological impact on the
52 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.50.
53 Fanon, F. (1965) 'Concerning Violence', in Mutiso, G. & Rohio, S. (1975) Readings in African Political
Thought. London: Heinemann, p.236.
54 Smith, AD. (1983) op cif, p.28.
55 Crowder, M. in Diamond, L. ef.a!. (1988) op cif, p.7.
56 Forster, E. M. (1924) cited in Smith, A. D. (1983) op cif, p.29.
57 Fanon, F. (1965) op cif, in Mutiso, G. & Rohio, S. (1975) op cif, p.237.
58 Ibid, p.237.




perceptions of indigenous peoples whereby they begin to feel that being white means the
opportunity to accumulate wealth.
Another common feature of colonial rule is located in its educational policies. Smith
argues that colonial systems of education on the whole were divided by the "ideology of
trusteeship and more dynamic belief in their civilizing mission towards the indigenous
populations".6o For instance, British educational policy in the colonies was developed
under the guise of preparing the local population for self-rule. Education was largely
concentrated in urban areas where a small minority of the people were educated through
the medium of Western values, beliefs and culture. To put it simply, they were taught
what was believed to be the essential qualities of the West. As a result, argues Fanon,
"the native intellectual accepted the cogency of these ideas, and deep down in his brain
you could always find a vigilant sentinel ready to defend the Graeco-Latin pedestal".61
Colonial educational policies not only resulted in the deliberate fostering of a small
educated elite that identified with the values and principles of the West, but it also
resulted in the creation of an elite-mass, urban-rural dichotomy. According to Afolayan,
this divide between urban educated elite and rural masses was encouraged by, for
example, the British, "to assure their own hegemony while forestalling the emergence of
a mass-based, supra-regional and unified anti-colonial movement that could successfully
challenge the colonial system itself,.62
From the common features of colonialism enumerated above, one can safely argue that,
the colonial state in Africa was a European product imposed on Africans from above. Its
features can be used to analyse post-independence African states because new leaders, in
varying degrees and measures, retained and preserved key elements of the colonial state
that they had inherited. It is to these inherited features, and others that arose in the post-
independence era that the dissertation now turns.
60 Smith, A. D. (1983) op cif, p.29.
61 Fanon, F. (1965) op cif, in Mutiso, G. & Rohio, S. (1975) op cif, p.239.
62 Afolayan, F. 'Nigeria: A Political Entity and a Society', in Beckett, P. & Young, C. (eds) (1997)
DIlemmas of Democracy in Nigeria. Rochester: Rochester University Press, p.51.
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1.4 Post-independence trends contiguous with colonial forms of governance
Clearly the form of state that emerged through post-independence reform was not the
same in every instance.63 Nevertheless, the character of the state remained much as it
was in the colonial era. 64 Like its predecessor, the post-independence African state
"continued to be totalistic in scope. It presented itself as an apparatus of violence and
relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority".65 Ake argues that the tendency
to reproduce the past was reinforced by the dispositions of the dominant social forces in
the post-independence era. "None of them apparently had any serious interest in the
transformation, and all of them were only too aware that they could afford to broaden the
social bases of state power".66 Smith suggests that the objective of the nationalist leaders
was not to dismantle the inherited state. On the contrary, "African nationalist leaders
wanted to take over intact the colonial apparatus of power and order and set it to work for
the 'nation-to-be".67 The aim of reform, argues Mamdani, was "to reorganize power so
as to unify the nation through a reform that tended towards centralization".68
It is at this juncture that the concept of neo-colonialism is intertwined with a general
analysis of broad features of the colonial state in Africa, but deserves independent
analytical attention. Broadly speaking, the term 'neo-colonial' infers that following the
independence of most African states in the 1960s, there was an inextricable link between
the politics and economics of the colonial regime and that of the new African leaders and
the newly independent states. 69
During the first decade of African independence, hopes were high. As Gordon puts it,
"the early days of freedom from colonial rule were charged with excitement and full of
63 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.25.




67 Smith, A. D. (1983) op cif, p.53.
68 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.25.
69
See Keamey, S. L. (1999) The Quest for Hegemony: Kenya, KANU and the 1997 elections within the
context of African Statehood, Democratisation and Civil Society in Embryosis. Pieterrnaritzburg:
Umversity of Natal, UnpUblished Masters Dissertation, p.39.
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hope".70 Yet it would soon enough become evident that the excitement of independence
and freedom masked internal problems that required prompt solutions. New leaders
faced the problem of uniting fragile nations that had high expectations of material
improvements. In an attempt to overcome division and fragmentation brought about by
arbitrary colonial borders and 'divide and rule' policies, new leaders made nation-
building a priority. It was hoped that the powerful force of nationalism would create
homogenous nations from a variety of culturally and linguistically heterogeneous ethnic
groups. As Smith puts it: "Much of the point behind nationalism was in its ability to
attract diverse groups, to renew itself after attaining independence, and to provide a basis
and rationale for social and political units and institutions".7!
Nation building was an attempt at social reconstruction under the leadership of minority
groups of elites tutored by the missionaries and later by the metropole. According to
Little, this new and mainly urban strata drew on various urban associations such as trade
and welfare unions, and ethnic and tribal associations72 in order to foster a sense of
national unity and to combat the colonially inherited schisms in their respective
territories. Thus there is evidence that post-independence leaders In Africa made
systematic attempts to overcome some of the worst effects of colonial rule.
On the negative side, Gordon notes a problematic in as much as liberal constitutions
allowed new parties to contest the power of the original party of liberation. Not least
owing to this process of contestation, the state became a desired and disputed resource
and an arena of power struggles. As Gordon argues under these circumstances,
incumbent political parties had two options, "they could either use their positions to
strengthen themselves politically, or they could operate within the colonially positioned
democratic political structures and risk electoral defeat".73 An overwhelming majority of
post-independence ruling parties chose the former option and quickly moved to
consolidate their power and expand their political control. Within the next decade,
70 Gordon, A. A. & Gordon, D. L. (2001) Understanding Contemporary Africa. Boulder, London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, p.67.
71 Smith, A. .D. (1983) op cif, p.38.
72 Little, K. (1965) cited in Smith, A. D. (1983) op cif, p.49.
73 Gordon, A. A. & Gordon, D. L. (2001) op cif, p.70.
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almost all multi-party states gave way to single-party rule or military dictatorships.
Incumbent leaders throughout the sub-continent, while arguing from different
perspectives, unanimously supported the transition to single-party dominance. According
to Chazan, some claimed that the elimination of opposition merely sanctioned the unity
that actually existed, while others suggested that the multi-party system was divisive and
antithetical to the needs of economic development and national integration.
74
In the quest
for consolidation and centralization of power, it became more and more evident that
African leaders were following the example set by colonialism, not only in their use of
ideology as a weapon of indoctrination but also and more especially their use of coercive
means to achieve compliance, political control, and exclusive monopoly over government
structures and apparatuses. As Joseph states:
The command nature of the colonial state, its ultimate reliance on brute force,
and its highly exploitative practices paved the way for the predatory character
of many post-independent African regimes, and the prevailing 'culture of
. ., 75ImpunIty.
As the above argument suggests, the first step and characteristic of neo-colonial rule in
Africa was to concentrate and centralize power. Important to the success of this step is
the second characteristics: the free use of force, or the threat of its use was utilized to
intimidate and eliminate the growing band of opposition forces, in the process, removing
elements that could challenge the authority of an incumbent elite. Apart from using
coercive means to limit growing opposition, ruling elites also co-opted various
autonomous organizations. In the most extreme cases, competing political parties or
independent organizations were banned, thus making the ruling party the only legitimate
political organization within single-party states. The same methods were used to
suppress and silence civil society. As Crawford Young notes: "Civil Society was
organized into party-structured ancillary organizations, which were mechanisms of
surveillance and control rather than participation and voice".76
74 See Chazan, N. et al. (1988) op cit, p.46.
75 Joseph, R. 'The Reconfiguration of Power in the Late Twentieth Century', in Joseph, R. (ed) (1999)
~tate, Conflict and Democra~y in Afric~. Bould~r, London: ~ynne Rienner Publishers, p.59.
Young, C. (1994) The African Cololllal State In Comparative Perspective. New Haven, London: Yale
University Press, p.288.
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Furthermore, the new leaders of Africa, motivated by the desire to maintain the status quo
and to fortify it, sought to further build on the administrative legacy of colonial rule. As
Young argues, colonial rule was not about good governance, but about capturing the state
and its resources to press it to serve the interests of the captors. This colonial legacy of a
predatory elite monopolizing state resources augmented the new elite's capacity for
comprehensive political control. For instance, new regimes systematically expanded
bureaucratic structures, such as police, army and civil service, in both size and functions.
In addition, party elites imposed extensive state control over internal and external trade
and established state-owned parastatal corporations. As Gordon notes:
While the number and size of almost all administrative bodies increased, greatly
expanded, too, were government bureaucracies and parastatals involved in
buying and marketing agricultural and mineral commodities, producing beer and
cigarettes, and controlling railroads, airlines, and electric power.77
Seen in this light, the neo-colonial state in Africa assumed the same statist, elitist and
predatory polices of their colonial predecessors and also justified their statism under the
premise that statist policies would be beneficial for all in terms of economic development
and growth.
The expansions of administrative apparatus, along with a proliferation of state-owned
corporations, resulted in the development of a top-heavy bureaucratic state that as
Mamdani expressed, was "suspended over society".78 It was the state, Ake argues, that
was no longer a reassuring presence guaranteeing the rule of law, but a formidable threat
to all except the few who controlled it,79 not least because virtually all the bodies that
could have limited or checked executive power were all displaced with the creation of
single-party states and dictatorships.
It has also been argued by many authors that another characteristic of neo-colonial rule
lay in the discretionary distribution of patronage and the development of clientelistic ties
to key individuals and groupS.80 Throughout the post-independence era in Africa,
77 Gordon, A. A. & Gordon, D. L. (2001) op cit, p.71.
78 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cit, p.11.
79 Ake, C. op cit, in Hipp1er, J. (ed) (1995) op cit, p.73.
80 See Chazan, N. et. al. (1988) op cit, and pp. 172-177 for a comprehensive account of patronage.
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African regimes had to find ways to maintain their support, and the development of
networks became the most common form of political exchange in order to construct
stronger bases of support. The provision of rewards, government contracts and
employment is a decisive tool used to construct alliances and to insure a modicum of
contro1.8l By offering access to state resources, incumbent dictators and ruling party
loyalists manage to some extent to achieve political acquiescence, however fragile and
incoherent. This phenomenon has been labelled some authors as the 'economics of
affection' or the 'politics of affection' .82 However, it is arguable that the literature of
patronage and patrimonial rule should be treated with caution because the trouble with
arguments about the 'the patrimonial state' is that they come largely from Euro-American
scholars who often are basing their definitions on comparisons between the post-colonial
states in Africa and the Early-modem state in sixteenth-to-eighteenth century Europe (for
instance, Thomas Callagy in Chazan, as cited above. This is a comparison that has been
rightly criticised by African scholars as ahistorical and reductionist. As Mamdani warns,
The Africanist is akin to those learning a foreign language that must translate
every new word back into their mother tongue, in the process missing precisely
what is new in a new experience. From such a standpoint, the most intense
controversies dwell on what is indeed the most appropriate translation, the most
adequate fit, the most appropriate analogy that will capture the meaning of the
phenomenon under observation.83
I therefore take my cue from Mamdani and omit reference to patrimonialism as an
independent variable. Instead, I focus on the personalization of power, which as defined
by Ghai incorporates patrimonial elements as dependent variables.
Patrimonial rule is a form of personal rule that does not tolerate opposition.
Administration is based on the total power and discretion of the ruler. The
bureaucracy is an extension of his household and to which he delegates its
power. He is above the law. He is the 'father' of his people, he is the 'father'
of his nation. 84
The personalization of power gave rise to what Okoth-Ogendo terms 'imperial
presidency,.85 What characterised personal rule was firstly, "the supremacy of the office
81 Ibid, p.l72.
82Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.13.
83 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.12.
84 Ghai, Y. 'The Theory of the State in the Third World and the Problematics of Constitutionalism' in
Greenberg, D. ef.a!. (1993) Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary W~rld.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.186.
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of the President over all organs of government".86 As explained elsewhere, the
centralization of the executive, legislative and judiciary was a phenomenon and tool used
by most post-independence African regimes. The explanation provided earlier argues
that this move ensured a degree of security. Therefore, in as much as the colonized were
encouraged to identify the power and might of the colonial regime with the person of a
colonial governor, so the post-colonised were encouraged to conceptualise the post-
colony in terms of the 'President for Life'.
The second index of personal rule was "the immunity of the president from the legal
process, civil and criminal, as long as he remains in office".87 What this translated to was
that the president was above the law. His immunity also protected him from criticism,
accountability and any form of judicial prosecution. The personalization of power also
gave the president indefinite eligibility for re-election. Therefore, just as the office of the
governor was not dependent on the wishes or support of the colonised, so the office of the
president was created irrespective of whether or not the post-colonised thought is
appropriate. In other words, what the majority of the population actually wants plays no
or little part in the process of governance and the creation of high office.
However, in as much as personal rule tends to be repressive, it also "generates the
concerns of survival within those channels that translates easily into sycophantic
behaviour toward the presidency: and it identifies the presidency as the only source of
final redress even for the simplest of problems".88 The result or consequences of this
behaviour sees the emergence of patron-client networks in which the incapacitating
syndrome of dependency develops. However, this arguably is not unique to Africa. Only
in societies where unemployment is rife and poverty is widespread will clientelism
flourish because, too often, people have no other way to survive economically. As
Fatton notes:
In an environment of growing scarcity, African ruling classes bent on
85 Okoth-Ogendo, H. w. O. 'Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political





preserving their status are forced to rely of external capitalist forces to obtain
more resources with which to finance their patronage. They are inevitably
drawn into links of dependence upon imperialist centres.89
Thus, the patron-client networks that emerged on the continent are contingent on the
phenomenon of economic dependency. Therefore, to reiterate the point made earlier, I
omit any reference to patron-clientilism and patrimonialism as independent variables in
my examination of the neo-colonial state.
As Ayoade argues, Africans could not have avoided this crisis of economic dependency
"because they perceived the state in Africa as an imposition, on the one hand, and as an
instrument for satisfying the needs of the people on the other".9o Elsewhere, it has also
been argued that the development of networks for survival was an offshoot of a
combination of capitalist/colonial state, which had been imposed on African societies
during colonialism. Its bureaucracy and coercive apparatus, as it were, had been foreign
in origin. Not least because of this external imposition, the post-colonial state was not a
significant improvement on its predecessor, since only the personnel changed, not the
fundamental structures. This meant that the state in Africa was essentially capitalist and,
within a dependency framework, still externally dependent.9\ Ziemann and Lanzendorfer
also argue that the economic transformations of independent states in Africa differed
from early modem European states where the transition from feudal to industrial societies
was smooth and predicated on endogenous factors. A capitalist state cannot emerge in a
society where the majority of the people were not capitalist before colonization, and only
became capitalist because they were forced to.
As Ziemann and Lanzendorfer further point out, promises were made to the people
during the anti-colonial struggle for a better deal under an indigenous government that
would provide for all their needs. Once in office, the post-independence politician in
order to keep his promise "used state resources to placate his constituency, thereby
89 Fatton, R. (1992) op cit, p.55-56.
90 Ayoade, J. A. 'States Without Citizens: An Emerging African Phenomenon', in Rothchild, D. & Chazan,
N. (ed) (1988) The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Boulder, London: Westview Press,
rl.1~O. " ,
ZIemann, W. & Lanzendorfer, M. cIted III Nyang oro, J. (1989) The State and Capitalist Development in
Africa. New York: Praeger Publishers, p.126.
26
creating a false impressing about the affluence of the state".92 The result, as Nyang'oro
notes, was the growth in excessive demands made by the people for the redistribution of
public funds that "placed severe limitations on economic development and on the state's
ability to pursue an effective program to eliminate underdevelopment".93 The state
became the primary distributor of benefits without regard for the costs. It also had to rely
heavily on external donors to provide loans to finance consumption habits. This resulted,
among other problems, in massive corruption that gave rise to economic disequilibria.
Returning to the problematic of personal rule in Africa, Nyang'oro argues that it does not
necessarily mean that politicians and bureaucrats are inherently corrupt or 'tribalist'.
"Their behaviour is a response to a particular kind of socio-economic system in which
they find themselves".94 In an environment where socio-economic constraints are
rampant, poverty and unemployment is rife, and "control of the state itself becomes
remarkably susceptible to narrow shifts in alliances among the ruling petty-bourgeois
elements,,95 and anyone else who can manage to become dependent on the state for their
survival. At this stage, where the state plays a major role in distributing funds and where
economic dependency at both the international and local level is prevalent, economic
decay manifests itself in political instability, systematic corruption and mal-
administration. However, this range of phenomenon is not unique to Africa, and cannot
be simply dismissed as mismanagement and ineptitude. In general, one has to take into
consideration the social and historical factors conditioning the political adaptation of
personal rule in relation to the development of patron-client networks.
To summarize this section, and reiterate a few points, it is important to note that the ease
and speed with which authoritarian regimes were created was a result of, and rooted in
the social and economic by-products of colonial rule. Post-independence rulers had
inherited all the structures of colonial rule. Neo-colonialleaders in particular, modified
the state and its structures to suit their motives of consolidating power. Their objectives
92 Ibid, p.104.
:: Nyang'oro, J. (1989) The State and Capitalist Development in Africa. New York: Praeger, p128.
Ibid, p.129.
95 Thomas, C. (1974) cited in Nyang'oro, 1. (1988) op cif, p.128.
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were successfully achieved by systematically eliminating oppositional forces within a
given territory, extending patronage to loyalists, and by generally extending their hold
over society by the use of force, or the threat of its use. Thus to conclude this chapter,
and in brief, one can characterize the neo-colonial paradigm in Africa as follows:
• The shift from liberal, multi-party constitutions endowed by departing colonial
powers to de jure one-party states.
• While one-party state were not necessarily or intentionally authoritarian to begin
with, the retention of some colonial and repressive laws within the new
constitutions with which to crush opposition forces and silence dissenting voices
enabled these states to become authoritarian.
• While ideologies differed between post-independence states, methods were
similar: the operation of oppressive laws reinforced by coercion and the use of
state-sanctioned violence.
• Centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of a small clique of party
leaders and loyalists.
• Systematic expansion of size and numbers of state institutions, as well as
parastatals - 'top-heavy state, suspended over society'.
• Statist, elitist and predatory policies.
• Incorporation of civil society organizations within the state in order to monitor
and control them; co-option of civil society leaders.
• Culture of entitlement for state elites; culture of silence for society and potential
leaders of dissenting opinion.
• State perceived as the source of all good things, and as the personal property of
the elite/ 'father of the nation'.
• Dependent economies; uneven distribution of resource; incorporation into the
world economy on a peripheral and unequal basis; heavy reliance on international
financial institutions, multi-national companies, and donor countries.
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CHAPTER TWO: NEO-COLONIAL MALAWI: THE BANDA REGIME
2.1 Introduction
The strongman, usually the president, occupies the centre of political life.
Front and centre stage. He is the central force around which all else revolves.
Not only the ceremonial head of state, the president, commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, head of government and even chancellor of the local university.
His aim is typically to identify his person with the 'nation'. His physical self is
omnipresent: as in Orwell's 1984 Big Brother is plastered on public walls, bill-
boards and even private homes. His portrait also adorns stamps, coins, paper-
money and even T-shirts and buttons often distributed to the party 'faithful'.
Schools, hospitals and stadiums are named after him. The mass media herald
his every word and action no matter how insignificant. I
It is the aim of this chapter to establish that during the post-independence regime of Dr
Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Malawi fitted into the paradigm of the neo-colonial state as
defined and depicted in the previous chapter. The arguments in this chapter will
therefore utilize points of departure and modes of analysis similar to those in the previous
chapter. From the outset it should be emphasised that while Malawi fits the neo-colonial
paradigm, one neo-colonial characteristic in particular is dominant and informs all other
characteristics, as suggested in the quotation which begins the chapter. In the Banda era,
Malawi was emblematic of the notion of the state as the personal property or fiefdom of
the ruler. Indeed he overshadowed and dominated Malawian state and society to an
extent that - it may be argued - made the name 'Banda' synonymous with the country
'Malawi'. This dominant and overshadowing aspect of Malawi's neo-coloniallandscape
will be argued in more detail in the next chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, it is
sufficient to note that through the manipulation of the country's independence
constitution, and consequently, the narrowing of political space through laws and
I Sandbrook, R. & Barker, J. (1985) cited in Gordon, A. A. & Gordon, D. L. (2001) op cit, p.75.
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legislation, that this era discernibly consisted of "mutually determining and reinforcing
political apparatuses of authoritarianism, paternalism and repression".2
2.2 Colonial Malawi
2.2.1 Law, land and labour
Malawi was declared a British Protectorate in May 1891, and Sir Harry Johnston was the
first Commissioner and Consular General. Right from the outset, the new colonial
administration began to take steps to make its presence effective by asserting its authority
and insisting that Africans pay taxes in order to meet the costs of administration.3 The
subjection and demand for Africans to pay taxes to the colonial administration was
justified on the grounds of the costs incurred by the British in suppressing the slave trade
and maintaining law and order. This was coupled with the fact that colonial
administrators in Malawi lacked sufficient resources to finance their operations. The lack
of financial support from the British government stemmed from the British government's
logic that "colonies were acquired for the benefit of the parent state, and unless they were
needed for strategic reasons, they were expected to pay for themse1ves".4
Johnston's initial task was to quickly and effectively establish British sovereignty over
the area, lay the framework of administrative control, exact and generate revenue, and
attempt to provide some measure ofjustice in determining the legitimacy of settler claims
to land obtained in the short period of European penetration.5 However, the acceptance
of British rule and authority was to prove not to be an easy task. For example, Johnston
encountered resistance from the Yao chief who refused to recognize British authority. It
took several years and a series of campaigns on the part of the British to finally break the
resistance of the Yao people. The example set by the Yao people serves as an inspiration
to my generations of Ma1awians in their protracted struggle against colonial and neo-
2 Mhone, G. 'The Political Economy of Malawi: An Overview', in Mhone, G. (ed) (1992) Malawi at the
Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Political Economy. Harare: SAPES, p.l
: Williarns, T. D. (1978) Malawi: The Politics of Despair. London: Comell University Press, p.53.
Ibid, p.58.
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colonial rule. On the other side of the Malawian border, the Yao people also experienced
the oppression of colonial invasion. Issued with an ultimatum of voluntary surrender or
invasion by a German imperialist in Tanzania, their chief wrote back in Kiswahili the
following words:
I have listened to your words but can find no reason why I should obey you -
I would rather die first. I have no relations with you and cannot bring it to my
mind that you have given me so much as a pesa (fraction of a rupee) or the
quarter of a pesa or a needle or a thread. I look for some reason why I should
obey you and find not the smallest. If it should be friendship that you desire,
then I am ready for it, today and always; but to be your subject. . .I do not fall
at your feet, for you are God's creature just as I am.. .I am sultan here in my
land. You are sultan there in yours. Yet listen, I do not say to you that you
should obey me; for I know that you are a free man...As for me, I will not
come to you, and if you are strong enough, then come and fetch me...6
Here also, the Yao people are of interest in a colonial context. They provide an example
of a split society, one section in (British) Malawi and another in (German) Tanzania.
Thompson argues that the imperial powers' imposition of state borders on African
territory had major ramifications. The problem lies with the fact that, when they were
delineated, these state boundaries rarely matched existing pre-colonial, political, social,
or economic divisions. They were 'arbitrary' because they reflected the short-term
strategic and economic interests of the imperial powers, and not the interests of Africans.7
Throughout Africa post-independence governments retained this problematic colonial
legacy.
When the British eventually succeeded in silencing the opposition of the colonised, their
land was taken away and handed over to the British in the name of crown property.
Elsewhere, the control of the administration was expanded by either punitive expeditions,
which included burning villages whose inhabitants had been unwilling to pay taxes, or by
treaties with chiefs.8
5 Ibid, p.54.
6 Onoge, O. 'Revolutionary Imperatives in African Sociology', in Waterman, P. (eds) (1977) African Social
Studies: A Radical Reader. London: Heinemann, pAl.
: T~ompson, A. (2000) An Introduction to African Politics. London: Routledge, pp.11-13.
Wllhams, T. D. (1978) op cit, pp.54-55.
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Besides the brief period of difficulties encountered in the colonial administration's
attempt to achieve control, another difficulty colonial rule encountered in Malawi was
that of "providing a set of laws that would express the sense of justice of the colonial
authorities and would carry some of the moral sanction of traditional custom".9 This
problem arose from "the fact that on some points at least, notions of justice and equity
differed between the new rulers and their subj ects". 10 This was aside from "the fact that
some of the new laws were primarily designed to entrench the power of the new rulers
and the small white-settler population".l1 In .addition, there were considerable
differences in customs between ethnic groups and therefore a general rule that might
seem applicable or reasonable to one ethnic group might not seem so applicable to
another group. Thus, as Williams states, to deal with this difficulty,
The administration sought to make allowance for a dual system of law
under which a large number of offences, including most of those involving
relationships among Africans were judged according to customary law
(though with provision for appeal to the colonial authorities). But the over-
ridding consideration remained the establishment and maintenance of
undisputed colonial rule, and there were times when principles of
jurisprudence played a distinctively secondary role to the administrative
d· 12expe lency.
In light of the brief discussion on colonial administration in Malawi, it is perhaps worth
reiterating Mamdani's points regarding direct and indirect rule. The legal system of
colonial British tribal authority provided for a dual system which accommodated 'tribal'
leadership to suit colonial requirements by either selectively reconstituting tribal
authority, or imposing tribal authority where none had existed before. Therefore,
colonial administration was grounded in a legal dualism where alongside received law
was implemented customary law. 13 Thus, the colonial state in Malawi fits Mamdani's





13 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cit, p.17.
14 Ibid, p.18.
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the classic form found in almost all British Colonial Africa, with a hierarchical structure
from the governor through various provincial and district commissioners". 15
Once the parameters of law were established, although these laws were not fixed, or set
in stone, the next priority of colonial administration was the establishment of a viable
economy that would provide the financial resources needed for the governor and the rest
of the people under his authority to continue their work and enable the handful of British
settlers in the colony to achieve a degree of commercial success sufficient to allow them
to maintain a satisfactory standard of life. The alienation of non-commercial, subsistence
farmers from the land and their replacement with commercially productive, settler-owned
and managed estates in which the colonized were utilized as cheap or unpaid labour was
a colonial strategy geared to provide a colony with most of its revenue. This strategy was
implemented in Malawi. Palmer notes that Malawi's first Consular General firmly
believed that the future of Malawi's economy "lay in a plantation, rather than a peasant
economy, and that some land should be given to European and Asian settlers, who would
promote the development of export crops such as coffee, tea and tobacco". 16
As Williams points out, the emphasis placed on rapid economic development "expected
that estate agriculture under British direction, supported by other British commercial and
industrial activities, would provide the means of transforming the economic life of the
territory".17 However, two acquisitions were crucial to the economic transformation of
the territory, that is, the land and the labour of the colonized. Both were acquired through
colonial legislation and court rulings. For example, poll and hut taxes served a dual
function of eventually forcing Africans to work on European owned estates so that they
could raise enough money to pay the colonial government. Therefore, "the tax policy
was used as a means of increasing the supply of labour to European employers". 18
15 Pike, J. G. (1968) Malawi: A Political and Economic History. London: Pall Mall Press, p.94.
16 Palrner, R. H. 'Johnston and Jameson: a comparative study in the imposition of colonial rule', in Pachai,
B. (1972) The Early History of Malawi. London: Longman, p.312.
17 Williarns, T. D. (1978) op cif, p.58.
18 Ibid, p.73.
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While it was possible to coerce 'voluntary' labour from Africans in this way, acquisition
of African land required ruthless action and legal engineering in the face of African
resistance. If Africans took their land claims to colonial magistrates, somehow the
disputes always were resolved in favour of settlers. The journal of the Blantrye Mission
highlights the plight of Africans in this regard.
At present with the exception of a few - a very few - natives who have got
grants of land from the government or have secured them by purchase or lease,
no native has any security of tenure for himself or his crops. If he has a house
or garden on an estate owned by a European, he may be moved any day after
certain notice, or he may have to make such arrangements as regards to rent or
services to make it suitable for him to move elsewhere. If he is on government
land he may have the land he has settled or transferred to some private purchaser;
and though the deed of transfer secures his rights, yet the new conditions are
such as he will no doubt prefer to move elsewhere. In neither case is there
permanency of occupation guaranteed to him which alone can induce him
to put his surroundings on a permanent basis. He will not build a permanent
house nor will he care to plant and cultivate slow maturing plants, crops or trees. 19
The first crop to be introduced in the colony was cotton. The targeting of cotton
production was intended to serve the interest of the metropole, that is, to reduce "British
dependency on American cotton".20 Capital was injected into Malawi to enable farmers
to invest in the cultivation of the crop as it was hoped that Malawi, among other colonies
would produce a crop able to compete with American cotton on the world market.
However, during the first decade of the 20th century it became apparent to cotton farmers
that there was much less scope than had been imagined for any major expansion cotton
production owing to a climate inhospitable to cotton farming. Other agricultural
innovations, such as the production of coffee beans, failed for the same reason.
Plantation owners then turned to tobacco, a crop that local Africans successfully
produced and which predated colonialism. Under settler methods of production, tobacco
became the backbone of colonial Malawi's economy. The only other successful cash
crop was tea. With its heavy dependence on only one or two cash crops, colonial Malawi
fits the dependency paradigm of uneven development and vulnerability to the fluctuations
19 Shepperson and Price, cited in Williams, T. D. (1978) op cit, p.68.
20 Ibid, p.83.
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in the world market. Furthermore, by decimating (through land and labour policies) the
pre-colonial ability of African households to be self-sustaining in crop production, the
colonial authorities potentially exposed the colonized to impoverishment and hunger
without offering any long-term productiveness or economic stability in return.
2.2.2 Educational policies
It has been noted by Pike that the outlook of the administration was conservative, and as
long as law and order were being maintained, "all questions of education were left to the
missionaries".21 The Scottish missionaries were the ones eager to produce Christians
who were at the same time literate and skilled artisans, capable of assisting in the
transformation which they hoped, and initially expected would be brought about in the
material environment. 22 Various missions established a network of schools. Although
some initial scepticism about European education among many Africans existed in the
early days, some responded to perceived opportunities offered by education. As
Williams notes, "they quickly appreciated the merits of a scheme which, with some
adaptability and hard work on their part, would give them access to favoured positions in
the social order introduced by colonial rule".23 Colonially induced poverty also caused
Africans to pursue missionary education in the hope of employment that would pay for
food and taxes. However, missionary education of Africans had unforeseen
consequences. Firstly, it soon became apparent that employment opportunities for
Africans were limited. Displaced from their land and unable to pay their taxes, many
migrated south to the mines of Central and South Africa. The loss of skilled and literate
people would eventually impact on the further development of the country. Secondly,
most European plantation owners and employers were hostile to skilled and literate
Africans who posed a threat to a colonial mentality of racial superiority and dominance.
As Williams puts it, settlers typically felt that "providing Africans with advanced
education that goes beyond elementary education would encourage the spread of
21 Pike, J. G. (1968) op cit, p.95.
22 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cit, pp78-79.
23 Ibid, p.79.
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impractical and dangerous ideas".24 Most European employers favoured an education
system that would provide Africans with just enough education to keep them as artisans
and semi-skilled workers. As Williams explains it:
The educational system favoured by this type of employer was one in which
a relatively large proportion of the population had some exposure to education
but in which very few, or better still none at all, had more than was necessary
to implant a few basic skills and some degree of discipline.25
As Afolayan notes, British educationalists preferred to keep education for Africans at an
elementary level to assure that their hegemony would not be compromised. He suggests
that colonial governments provided only very basic and limited education in order to
forestall the emergence of a mass-based unified anti-colonial movement that would
challenge colonial authority,z6
2.3 From colony to post-colony
2.3.1 Origins of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and Banda's dominance
Malawi's independence from colonial rule also is typical of the neo-colonial genre in as
much as it was negotiated by a tiny elite, dominated by one man, notionally on behalf of
a largely uneducated, rural based population. In Malawi's specific case, what needs to be
noted at the outset is the extraordinary dominance of one man over Malawi's part in the
negotiations.
Like many nationalist movements in Africa, the origins of the Malawi Congress Party
(MCP) grew out of a response to colonial rule. However, the main impetus of the
Congress movement was provided by its resistance to Britain's idea of a Federation,
which would incorporate Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and Malawi (then Nyasaland)
into one territorial unit for the economic, and strategic advantage of the metropole.
24 Ibid, p.80.
25 Ibid, p.80.
26 Afolayan, F. op cif, in Beckett, P. & Young, C. (ed) (1997) op cif, p.51.
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At the time, Congress leadership was drawn largely from a small number of educated
men. However, "although they were concerned with the needs and aspirations of their
less fortunate countrymen, these men tended to lack either intuitive or ideological
sympathy with the poorly educated peasant farmers who accounted for most of the
population".27 Williams argues that what they did bring to the nationalist movement was
youthful dynamism and energy. Unfortunately, though these youthful leaders were too
young and inexperienced to win the loyal support and faith of the elders. It was under
these circumstances that Chipembere, a young member of the Congress, decided that Dr
Banda must be persuaded to return to his 'mother country' and lead the nationalist
movement.
Dr Banda was targeted as a potential leader for a number of reasons. Firstly he was
against the Federation, and although to many Malawians he was not well known, it was
believed he had qualities of education and charisma that would appeal to all sections of
the population. Also, the young members of Congress admired him for his articulate
opposition to colonialism. According to Williams, Chipembere believed that,
His age, his manifest courage, and eminence would appeal most powerfully to
rural elders; his education, his profession, and his success would gain the
respect of the young educated militants; he would know how to deal with Euro-
peans - due to his familiarity with leading politicians in Britain.28
Thus, it was believed that the very fact that Dr Banda had spent approximately forty years
outside the country, for the most part in Britain, meant that the British government would
be faced with a man that could speak and understand their language and culture with
ease, enabling him to effectively challenge the British government.
Personal unfamiliarity with Banda might have also encouraged the young militants to
believe that upon his return Banda would not wish to concern himself with the details of
the party organization and policy. Williams speculates that the young lions of the party
envisaged Banda as a respected and articulate figurehead who would successfully bring
Malawi to independence but then would stand down so that young nationalists could take
27 W'11'I lams, T. D. (1978) op cif, p.116.
28 Ibid, p.173.
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over the reins of leadership?9 If so, they were deluding themselves. Prior to his return to
Malawi, Banda stated that he was prepared to return "only if he was guaranteed the
presidency of the Congress Party, the right to hand-pick the executive and extensive
powers to run the nationalist movement in whatever way he though right".3o Already, his
quest for dominance and sole custody of the party was in evidence. His request duly was
granted and on the 6th July 1958, Dr Banda arrived in Malawi to a welcome organized by
the young nationalists he would later terrorize into exile or silence.
To Banda his return marked the beginning of a new life after a long period of self-
imposed exile. As soon as he had been accepted as the party leader, he moved quickly to
consolidate his power and transform the MCP into his own personal system of control.
As Phiri notes,
The nationalist movement driven by a single-minded commitment to the
achievement of independence, cultivated an intolerable political culture
characterized by hero-worship, centralized authority structures, exclusiveness,
and intimidation of potential critiCS. 31
The rights conceded to Banda to handpick the party executive and run the movement as
he saw fit meant that Malawi indeed began as Banda intended her to go on. In addition to
his efforts to create mass support, "Banda proposed the creation of the Women's League,
and also of a Youth League". 32 By creating other structures and branches of the party he
managed to increase the party's membership. More importantly, it has been noted that
his unexpected gift for oratory contributed to the party's increasing popularity with the
masses. According to Short,
He preached the four virtues of Unity, Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline.
Above all, he vilified 'their stupid Federation', and that innocent adjective
laden with such venom soon become for Africans the most explosive curse.33
29 Ibid, p.174.
30 Ibid, p.174.
31 Phiri, K. M. & Ross, K. R. 'Introduction: From Totalitarianism to Democracy in Malawi', in Phiri, K. M.
~ Ross, K. R. (eds) (1998) Democractisation: A Stocktaking. Blantrye:CLAIM, p.10.
Ibid, p.91.
33 Short, P. (1974) Banda. London: Routledge, pp.91-92.
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Banda combined paradoxical qualities of nationalism and populism on the one hand, with
being more British than the British on the other. For example, he always spoke in
English with an interpreter in attendance. 34 "Even on the hottest days he dressed as he
would in England, in the familiar three-piece suit and black homburg hat, with a beige
raincoat to keep off the dust and brown leather gloves".35 But, as Short comments, "far
from detracting from his popular appeal this served rather to heighten it by placing him
. h h E l' 1 " 36on par Wit t e uropean ru mg c ass.
Initially Banda's paradoxical tactics both increased his popularity with the mass of the
people and enabled him to maintain an aloof and superior distance in the style of the
British colonizers. Arguably, it gave him psychological control which he soon enough
amplified with the use of terror tactics. However, in the beginning, at least, the future
looked bright for Malawi.
The road to independence was a protracted one of step-by-step movement to full
independence that began with the London Constitutional Conference of 1960 which
produced a constitution which reflected the new imperial policy of co-operation with
African nationalists. Although white settlers opposed Banda's demands, the
qualifications provided for the eligibility of franchise, enabled some 200,000 Malawians
to vote,37 and the road to partial self-governance was finalised. Once the London
Conference was over, Dr Banda returned to Malawi and started making successful
preparations for the 1961 elections in which the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) won
every seat in the Lower roll.
2.4 Onset of neo-colonialism
Initially it seemed that the new Government intended to overturn colonial legacies. As
Williams notes, "There was a campaign on the Ghanaian model, to promote adult
34 It is generally agreed that his Chichewa was terrible, in Lawson, M. (2000) 'Civil Society in Malawi'.
OD Debate, Vol. 7, No. 2, pA.
35 Short, P. (1974) op cit, p.92.
36 Ibid, p.92.
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literacy; and a campaign to encourage the adoption of better methods of agriculture".38
Also, the new Government set to work with enthusiasm to redress some of the repressive
laws of the colonial administration. There was new legislation, much of it designed to
give effect to the promises made during the election campaign, or to replace laws that
were held to be discriminatory. For example, Banda introduced the Africans on Private
Estates Ordinance, which abolished the system of thangata a colonial law that bordered
on feudalism. It stipulated that estate owners were permitted to compel Africans living
on their property to supply labour in lieu of rent. 39 Also abolished by Banda was the
coercive colonial clause of mwalimidwe which prescribed agricultural practices of
Africans.
The good work done by Banda and his colleagues in the party at this early stage of the
independence process reinforced his and the party's popular appeal. An example of an
attempt to redress some of the worst effects of colonial legal dualism occurred when
between them, Banda and Orton Chirwa (Secretary to the Minister of Justice) improved
the status of the former native courts by providing for (through the Local Courts
Ordinance) an independently appointed Chairman, thus removing judgements in
customary cases from the political control of the state. Hence during the period prior to
full independence elections in 1964, steps were taken by Banda and other cabinet
ministers to relieve ordinary Malawians of some particularly punitive and archaic
colonial laws, and to improve the standing of customary law but not, however, to abolish
it. Thus a dualist legal system stayed in place, and the Malawian state remained, in
Mamdani's terminology, 'bifurcated'. This attempt at reform but lack of real change was
entrenched by full independence in 1964 and the constitution which accompanied it. This
constitution (and others like it in newly independent African states) have been much
criticized by African political analysts. As Kanyongolo remarks,
Like many constitutions drafted as part of the process of transition from colonial
rule to independence, the 1964 constitution was no more a symbol of a de facto
37 Ibid, p.196.
38 Short, P. (1974) op cit, p.154.
39 Ibid, p.77.
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transfer of power that symbolised the end of colonialism.
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In other words, the constitution signified a transfer of power from one small elite at the
top of the state to another. It did not materially alter the structure of power in Malawi nor
empower ordinary Malawians. Chimombo makes a connection between the Malawian
constitution and those of other post-colonial constitutions. She argues that in most cases
constitutions only made small changes to previous constitutions that were in place during
colonial rule. As a result, the only significant change made in the constitutions of
independent African countries was the elimination of the racist aspect of colonial rule.41
Okoth-Ogendo also argues that new constitutions left the basic structures of colonial rule
intact
Two characteristics that dominated the colonial power and administration
was its labyrinthine bureaucracy; the other was its coercive orientation.
These were hallmarks of the colonial legal-order. The sheer presence of
state power in public administration in Africa was awesome. Without
exception, independence instruments preserved that order intact as the
foundations of administration in post-colonial Africa.42
Thus, although most post-independence constitutions contained liberal principles such as
the doctrine of the separation of powers and the principle of limited government that
conformed to the theory that government ought to conform to the rule of law,43 most
structures such as the bureaucratic machinery were left as they were.
Having noted that various political and legal analysts have looked beneath the surface of
independence constitutions and found that many of the old structures were left intact, it
remains to be said that at first glance, Malawi's new constitution seemed to be a liberal
one, much like that of all other former British colonies and trust territories. Okoth-
Ogendo describes the standard independence constitution as "based on a modified
version of the Westminster model, complete with bicameral legislatures, separation of
40 Kanyongolo, F.E. 'The Limits of Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism in Malawi', in Phiri, K.M. &
Ross, K.R. (eds) (1998) op cit, p.356.
4\ Chimombo, T. (1997) The Legacy of the Past in Malawi. (BA Honours Thesis) Smith College:
Department of African-American Studies, p.26.
:~ Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. op cit, in Greenberg, D. et.a!. (1993) op cit, p.69.
Ibid, p.66.
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powers, judicial review of legislature and executive action, and the Bill of Rights".44
According to Short, during the initial days of independence,
Banda publicly maintained strict adherence to the Westminster ideal of
democracy, emphasising the right of his political opponents to 'freedom of
speech and association', and declared more that once that he would welcome
the formation of rival political groupS.45
However, as Short notes, a subsequent speech indicated that Banda was having second
thoughts. He argued that Malawi could not be a 'carbon copy of any other country' and
added that:
Democracy in Europe cannot be democracy in Africa. Any politician, any
statesman who interprets democracy in Africa in terms of the British
Constitution, the American Constitution, the Swiss Constitution....does
not know what he is doing. Because we are not here living under the British
conditions and the American conditions. Here we have our own way of
doing things, we are copying from nobody. We will adopt from outside
what suits and fits the conditions of this country.46
Banda's reaction to criticism and opposition from members of his cabinet was the event
which signalled the onset of autocratic, personal rule, and the use of terror to silence
dissent. He did not stop with the dismissal of the Ministers who had queried and
criticised a number of his policy decisions. He began a campaign of systematically
silencing opposition voices and shrinking political space in Malawi, leaving room only
for himself and a small number of uncritical cronies. One of the first victims of the neo-
colonial era in Malawi was Orton Chirwa, founder of the MCP, and one of the cabinet
ministers opposed to some of Banda's policies was "abducted by security agents in
Zambia and died in Zomba prison under mysterious circumstances".47
With frightening speed, Banda dropped his pose of benevolent patemalism48 and revealed
his true, neo-colonial colours. He reactivated the Preventative Detention Bill inherited
44 Ibid, p.70.
45 Short, P. (1974) op cit, p.252.
46 Hansard, Zomba, 24 February 1964, in Short, P. (1974) op cit, p.254.
47 Australian Arrmesty International (1993), in Banda, J. 'The Constitutional Change Debate of 1993-1995,
Phiri, K. M. & Ross, K. R. (ed) (1998) op cit, p.318.
48 Banda often referred to his cabinet ministers as 'my boys'. As Williarns notes: The cabinet ministers
never greatly appreciated the President's patronizing references to them, but by the middle of 1964, they
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from colonial rule; he promulgated a decree banning all public meetings and processions
which had not secured police consent; he introduced new security regulations that
restricted supposedly rebellious persons to a specified area, and required him or her to
report to the police at designated intervals. As Short comments, "it was a bitter irony
that, after less than three months after independence, Banda would resort to the same
restrictive measures that had been so much hated when used by the colonial authorities
against his own party".49 This display of intolerance to opposition in the first months of
Malawi's independence "was to prove a decisive event in Malawi's post-independence
history as it exposed Banda's tendency towards authoritarian rule".5o
2.4.1 Constitutional changes and the shift to one-party rule
The cnSlS came too soon after independence and "had dire consequences for the
democratisation process in Malawi".51 With the Cabinet Crisis behind him, the move to
create a one-party state was the next step in Banda's journey towards absolutism. Soon
after the Cabinet Crisis, Banda realized that he had to discard parliamentary rule in
favour of personal autocracy. Within less than a year after attaining independence,
discussions were underway to lead the nation down a path of constitutional reform.
African leaders, to justify constitutional changes, put various arguments forward. As
Okotho-Ogendo notes, a continent-wide shift to de jure one-party states was laced with
the rhetoric and language of the need for rapid economic development. 52 Commenting on
the language of economic development as purported by many African leaders, Claude
Ake called neo-colonial African states 'developmental dictatorships' .53
had sharper and more profound reasons to express their dissatisfaction. See Williams, T. D. (1978) op cif,
p.213.
49 Ibid, p.221.
50 Banda, 1. 'The Constitutional Change Debate of 1993-1995', in Phiri, K. M. & Ross, K. R. (ed) (1998)
op cif, p.318.
51 Banda, 1. op cif, p.318.
52 See Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. op cit, in Greenberg, D. et.al. (1993) op cit, p.n.
53 I fust heard this phrase in a conversation held with my supervisor Alison Jones who in 1992 attended
Claude Ake's seminar at the Department of Political Science, Durban Campus, University of Natal.
According to her, Professor Ake did not distribute a paper. Her citation and recollection derives from notes
taken as he talked. She told me that Professor Ake offered to his audience a particularly memorable
symbolic illustration ofa condition induced in Africa by 'Developmental Dictatorships'. Transcribed in
her notes, it reads as follows: "in the 1970s and 80s, one uniform symbol was encountered by travellers in
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Malawi was no exception to this rule. Banda's regime "emphasized the goal of economic
development to the extent that it became the end that justified any means of assuming and
exercising state power even if it resulted in the disempowerment of civil society".54 The
rationale behind the argument that constitutional reform was necessary for economic
development stemmed from the belief that "a fragmented power structure would pose
severe drawbacks to central planning, financial coordination, and the formulation of
policies on important matters".55
The regime also cited the preservation of national security as an additional justification
for constitutional change. It was argued by the Banda regime that unity, obedience,
loyalty and discipline were necessary for a stable and secure country and economy. As
Chazan argues:
To drive home this point, many governments undertook to rewrite pre-
independence constitutions to reflect the shifts in the political sphere and
ostensibly to provide themselves with greater power. Kenya, Uganda, Malawi,
Zambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone stand out in this respect.56
Drastic changes were made to Malawi's constitution behind closed doors without
consulting the electorate. The changes were ratified on the 6th May 1966. In the context
of this dissertation, the relevant amendments are as follows:
• The MCP was to be the only legally recognized political party in the country.57
• Dr Kamuzu Banda was to be head of government and head of state for the rest of
his natural life.58
• The President could nominate any Member of Parliament and had the power to
appoint the Speaker of Parliament.59
almost all countries in Africa. Billboards reading: 'SILENCE! DEVELOPMENT IN PROGRESS' adorned
national highways at regular intervals".
54 Kanyongolo, F. E. op cit, in Phiri, K. M. & Ross, K. R. op cit, p.358.
:: Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. op cit, in Greenberg, D. et.a!. (1993) op cit, p.72.
Chazan, N. et.a!. (1988) op cit, p.47.
57 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1966, Section 4, in Kanyongolo, F. E. op cit, in Phiri, K. M &
Ross, K. R. (ed) (1998) op cit, p.359.
58 Ibid, Section 9, p.359.
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• He would be authorized to make or revoke all public service appointments, either
directly or through the public service commission.6o
• He could make statutory regulations governing the civil service. 61
• He could appoint the Chief Justice and make or terminate other judicial
appointments, except those of judges.62
• The President would also be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and
would have emergency powers allowing him to rule by proclamations reviewable
within seven days if Parliament were sitting or thirty days if it were not.63
• The President could dissolve Parliament at any time.64
• Subsequent presidents were to be elected only from nommees of the MCP
h · h 65lerarc y.
• The government and the nation were to operate on the basis of the four
'cornerstones' ofVnity, Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline.66
Thus as Banda notes, in general, the 1966 Republican constitution,
Had many autocratic tendencies built into it, and was thus a recipe for
gross violations of human rights, which followed. These included the emphasis
that was laid down in law and order as well as national unity, the declaration
of Malawi as a one-party state and the concentration of power in Dr Banda
as President-for-life of the party, Head of State, and Father and Founder of the
Nation.67
To sum up, Malawi under Banda "was a strong authoritarian state which was
constitutionally a one-party state dominated by a dictatorial style of leadership that was
characterized by a top-down flow of policies and decrees".68 Banda's control over every
arm of government ensured that even senior level government officials could not initiate
59 Ibid, Section 20 and 25 (c), p. 359.




64 Kanyongo10, F. E. Section 45 (2), p.359.
65 Ibid, Section 10 (2) (d), 11 (1) and 11 (2), p.359.
66 Ibid, Section 2 (1) (i), p.359.
:: Banda, 1. op cif, in Phiri, K. M. & Ross, K. R. (ed) (1998) op cif, p.317.
Mhone, G. (ed) op cif, p.3.
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the slightest bit of action without his permission or consent consequently, "the ministerial
and parliamentary structures were purely nominal and had the facile function of rubber-
stamping and rationalizing handed down policies".69 The extent to which Banda
monopolized political space, and the means he used to silence critical and dissenting
voices are discussed more fully in the next chapter. In short, the constitutional changes
that granted Banda life presidency saw him go down a road well travelled by many neo-
colonial leaders such as Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote
d'Ivoire and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire to name a few.
2.4.2 Educational policies
The question explored in this section is: to what extent, if any, did Banda's regime
implement significant improvements in education and literacy over and above the
minimal contribution made by colonial education policies? On the matter of educational
policy during the Banda era it should be emphasized that education and the privileging of
a particular ethnic group and language went hand in hand. For this reason and to this
extent educational policy fits the neo-colonial paradigm. However, in fairness to the
Banda regime, it also should be noted that there was a focus on secondary school
education, an area deliberately neglected by the colonial government for reasons already
discussed.
Malawians greeted the rapid expansion of secondary school education with enthusiasm.
The process of Africanizing the civil service and other state institutions and public
services meant that there were job opportunities, improved incomes and status available
to secondary school leavers. In 1965, on Banda's urging and initiative, Malawi's new
university opened its doors. However, as Williams notes, the government's expansion of
education in the secondary and tertiary sectors, and attempts to promote greater equality
of access to education were not without its political objectives.7o The origins of Banda's
political agenda are to be found in colonial practices of divide and rule. Colonial
69 Ibid, p.5.
70 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cit, p.288.
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administrations had used ethnicity and regionalism to privilege some groups or regions
over others. As Chirwa explains, the colonial regime favoured the Northern region which
as a result "had an edge over the inhabitants of the other two regions as far as educational
and professional achievements were concerned".7l A high proportion of skilled and
literate Northerners in Malawi's civil service posed a threat to Banda whose home region
was the Central region, largely inhabited by Chewas.
Two policies in particular ousted the Northerners from their privileged position and
ensured the dominance of Chewa language and culture. Firstly: Banda made a ruling to
the effect that "a paper in Chichewa be made a compulsory part of the primary-leaving
examination".72 Thus, from the 1969/70 school years, Chichewa was to be taught in
primary and secondary schools, Secondly, acting on the advice of the president, in 1972
this decree was extended and incorporated into the university's curriculum as part of
linguistics studies. 73 Between 1970 and 1994, Chichewa and English were the only
languages used by public officials and the Malawi broadcasting service. Malawians who
were proficient in neither language were at a quite serious disadvantage. Banda's
policies thus replicated and entrenched lines of colonial division, as well as making
Chewa culture hegemonic by promoting "the idea that Chewa culture was synonymous
with Malawi culture".74
The same principle applies when analysing the introduction of the quota system to
Malawi's university in 1989. The policy was intended to manipulate the country's
educational system because "previously, the North with about 12% of the population had
accounted for about half of university entrants".75 What was now being proposed was
that each district in each region would be granted only a specific number of places for
university entrants. This was to have serious implications for the students from the
Northern region. As Chirwa explains, "given that the North only has five districts,
7\ Chirwa, W. C. 'Democracy, Ethnicity, and Regionalism: The Malawian Experience', in Phiri, K. M. &
Ross, K R. (eds) (1998) op cit, p.59.
72 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cit, p.288.
73 Chirwa, W. op cit, p.62.
74 Lwanda, J. 1. cited in Chirwa, W. C. op cit, p.62.
75 Chirwa, W. C. op cit, p.61.
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against nine in the Centre and ten in the south, it meant a major reduction of Northerners
making it through university".76 In addition to this, it must be added that Dr Banda also
declared that at the University of Malawi, "politics, sociology and other sensitive subjects
should be taught along the basis of the conditions in Malawi".77 In essence, like his
colonial predecessors, Dr Banda made every effort to discourage the development of
critical or radical discourse.
Thus it can be concluded that while Banda's regime did much to improve educational
facilities and opportunities, neo-colonial factors and policies also were served. Whatever
his political objectives were, it was clear that his educational polices were aimed at
dividing the nation along ethnic and regional lines and this served a political purpose and
was arguably an "essential tactic for the survival of the one-party dictatorial regime".78
2.4.3 Ethnicity and patronage
As suggested by Banda' s educational and linguistic emphasis, the nurturing of a Chewa
base of support was crucial for the survival of his regime. Further, nurturing of a Chewa
support base was undertaken at two levels. First was the shifting of financial capital into
the Central region in order to develop its economy from the ground up. Lilongwe was
built up from scratch with the aid of regional donors. (South Africa was the main
financier). An intef?a.!i9nal airport w~s bui!!,_.a.nd on the first of January 1975, Lilongwe ,W~ ~ __I
. ",~. A-r.·rfut'1
became the capital city of Malawi. Secondly, in addition to urban development of the b4, If fac.r
Central region, rural development was targeted as the means for extending lines of 1'1 ':fS??
l-l W~j'
patronage into the Chewa peasantry through targeting its high status members; namely, ope.... ~ tl f~
the territorial chiefs and village headmen, who now became invariable recipients of state 1~3.
aid. As such, development aid flowed along an administrative hierarchy: from the chiefs
to the rural peasantry, ultimately strengthening the regime's base of support and securing
the support of peasantry of the Central region. In additional acts of patronage, Dr Banda
lavishly rewarded key figures in society, such as senior level government officials in
76 Ibid, p.61.
77 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cif, p.288.
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parliament, the anny, the police and civil servants. In so doing, he co-opted them in
support of the status quo, as well as neutralizing potential opposition.
2.5 The politics of dependency
The powers of the president to control the political destiny of the nation, both by virtue of
his fonnal constitutional position and by virtue of his total power to direct the machinery
of the party were supplemented by his comprehensive control over almost all fonns of
economic activity, with extensive discretionary powers in his own hands.79 Dr Banda's
ability to control the economic activity within Malawi was displayed in his foreign policy
initiatives and the country's increasing dependence on foreign aid and investment from
rich countries of the North and from the apartheid regime in South Africa.
However, in fairness to Banda it should be noted that he, like other independence leaders
in Africa, inherited an unevenly developed economy from the British colonizers which,
as explained above, was almost entirely fuelled by the agricultural sector which, in turn,
was dangerously undiversified. A decisive factor in Malawi's economic and political
dependence (as in most other newly independent African states) was the Cold War
context of the times. In a climate of intense rivalry between communist and capitalist
regions of the world, post-independence Africa was caught up in superpower rivalry. In
Malawi's case, Banda wholeheartedly supported the West. Like Ivory Coast and Kenya,
he implemented a capitalist system. In return, Western donor countries and agencies
willingly shored up his dictatorship, enabling him to stay in power for longer than might
have otherwise been the case. Thus, it should be noted that the West made a significant
contribution to a 'culture of silence' in Malawi
78 Ibid, p.60.
79 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cit, p.237.
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2.5.1 Foreign policy and investment
Malawi's, foreign policy under Dr Banda was one of 'discretional alignment' - a term he
coined for his foreign policy objectives. What this really meant was that he would accept
money irrespective of its source. However, in practice, Banda was pro-capitalist and the
nations of the West proved willing donors. "First the Americans, in 1962, and then, a
year later, Britain and Israel, followed by West Germany, Denmark and, to a lesser extent
Austria and France came forward with loans and grants in cash and kind".8o It was with
these countries that Malawi on becoming independent established diplomatic relations. 81
Banda's foreign policy initiatives included a co-operative attitude towards neighbouring
states still ruled by white minorities. This made him a "maverick among African heads
of state".82 In his analysis of Malawi's foreign policy, Mchombo argues that Malawi's
foreign policy was significantly influenced by Banda's personality.83 Malawi's policies
tended to mimic that of Britain and it is consequently why Malawi aligned herself with
the Western bloc. Mchombo speculates that this was perhaps because Banda identified
himself very closely with the British.84 Nkrumah's description ofneo-colonialleadership
exactly fits Banda's style. "In a number of territories, 'mother-country' ideology and
cultural identity have strongly affected certain leaders".85
With regard to Multi-national compames (MNCs), Banda maintained an open door
policy, but not without first ensuring that he and the party elite attained maximum
benefit. For instance, before investment could occur "a joint agreement between the
80 Ibid, p.173.
8\ Malawi sent permanent diplomatic representatives only to Britain, the United States and West Germany.
In addition to these countries, France and Israel established embassies in Blantrye while Denmark and
Austria were represented on a non-resident basis, cited in Short, P. (1974) op cit, p.173.
82 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cit, p.5.
83 "The crafting of Malawi's foreign policy was as much a function of global alliances, geopolitical factors,
and economic incentives as it of the personal character of Banda". Mchombo, S. 'Democratisation in
Malawi: Its Roots and Prospects', in Gros, J. (ed) (1998) Democratisation in Late Twentieth Century
Africa. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, p.25.
84 Ibid, p.25.
85 Nkrurnah, K. 'Neo-colonialism in Africa', in Mutiso, G. & Rohio, S. (eds) (1975) op cit, p.450. Lawson
(2000: 4) highlighted this: "Even during the early nineties he (Banda) was threatening to abandon is
leadership of the country and return 'home' to England".
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expatriate company and government had to be made in that government would insist on
substantial shareholding".86 This provided the government with an instrument of control
as the government's powers as a shareholder were supplemented by discretional powers
to decide the terms of trade and the terms in which the company could do business in
Malawi.8?
Williams explains the benefits accruing to foreign investors and expatriates as primarily a
result of the government's policy to hold wage levels as low as possible. He cites the
government's justification as one that would "encourage investors, stimulate the growth
of employment and, in the long run, provide the basis for a viable economy".88 He
further notes, "even many of the Europeans who remained in, or came to Malawi after
1964 no doubt preferred his policy even though they may have not entirely been in
agreement with his leadership style or the political environment".89
Moreover, Williams explains that while it is true that in the late 1960s and 70s, Malawi's
economy was relatively buoyant; it was achieved through harsh domestic discipline and
the fear that Banda instilled in Malawians. Also by cultivating cordial relationships with
white minority governments in neighbouring states, Banda secured further inflows of
foreign capital, thus helping to secure the national economy in a way that very few other
governments in Africa were willing to do. "Large capital inflows provided both the
investment resources and the foreign exchange reserves needed for the expansion of the
economy".90
2.5.2 Economic development and the politics of patronage
The most important sector of Malawi's economy remained the agricultural sector. As
Williams notes, "the centrepiece of the government's agricultural programs was the
:~ W~ll~ams, T. D. (1978) op cit, p.238. Also see Chazan, N. et.a!. (1988) op cit, p.244.





development of more sophisticated tobacco farming techniques among Malawians".91
For example, one of the government sponsored initiatives concentrated on development
projects in the rural area of Kasungu. Under the sponsorship and guidance of
government and agricultural research experts rural Malawian farmers were trained in
sophisticated methods of producing high quality flue-cured tobacco leaves. This program
was supported by the government, which made arrangement to provide land and credit to
enable farmers to settle on holding of 150 to 200 acres. In general, Malawi's tobacco
industry flourished. In 1964 and 1965 tobacco accounted for 37 and 38 percent,
respectively, of the country's export earnings. And by 1972 and 1973 it accounted for 45
and 44 percent, respectively".92
However, in the area of Banda's patronage strategies, it is of significance that Kasungu is
located in the Central (Chewa) region, and it in general is arguable that resources were
allocated in a way which facilitated the president's political survival rather than the
overall development of the economy. Additionally, the extent to which Banda and the
party elite accrued economic benefit to themselves is amply evidenced. Banda himself
owned and controlled Press Holdings Ltd., a company initially set up to run the party
newspaper, which became a front for various businesses, also owned and controlled by
the president. He maintained the loyalty of his ministers and henchmen in the party by
awarding them a number of privileges. For instance, the arbitrary power to revoke
trading licences and in the process, could manipulate personal business interests in their
own favour. Also, government loan schemes were frequently used to purchase and
develop farms for the party elite. As Williams adds, "the ease with which prominent
party members were able to obtain loans from the government cannot be divorced from
considerations of patronage".93 It should be noted that in all their business dealings and
strategies for accumulating personal profit, Banda and his government and party elite
were unaccountable to the people of Malawi. Hence, patronage breeds corruption, and




In conclusion, this chapter's argument, namely that Malawi fits the paradigm ofthe neo-
colonial state has been supported on a number of political and economic grounds. What
remains to be discussed are the ways in which the Banda regime invaded, controlled and




CHAPTER THREE: A 'CULTURE OF SILENCE' AND THE SHRINKAGE OF
OF POLITICAL AND CIVIC SPACE
3.1 Introduction
I learned quite early that the only rights I had as a political prisoner were
the right to prostrate myself before warders or officers chanting I am sorry
Sir, I am sorry Sir, I am sorry Bwana, even when I was not responsible
for whatever was supposed to have been amiss, even when I was not sorry. 1
Mapanje's eloquent explanation gives poignant expression to the meaning of silence in
neo-colonial Malawi. Hence, the aims of this chapter are as follows: firstly to elaborate
and emphasise key concepts used to explain and analyse the importance of civil society
organizations in Malawi in relation to addressing and criticizing neo-colonial tendencies
of the state. Two key concepts in particular, 'space' and 'voice', are closely addressed by
Ngugi wa Thiong'o in his book Penpoints, Gunpoints, and Dreams. Secondly, the
chapter aims to demonstrate the methods used by the Banda regime to shrink political and
civic space and to silence opposition and criticism. Therefore, this chapter can be
considered to be a bridge between this section and the next section which comprises
qualitative research and data analysis. This chapter also describes the conditions and
neo-coloniallegacies from which Malawians now are trying to liberate themselves.
Ngugi uses the concept of 'performance space' to signify a political and civic arena in
which the state and its people compete to be heard. In the chapter "Art War With The
State", Ngugi argues,
The state in a class society is an instrument of control in the hands of what-
ever is the dominant social force. Art on the other hand, in its beginnings
was always an all of human search for freedom from hostile nature and nurture. 2
This is where tension between the artist and the state is located as both seek to carve out
performance space. On the one hand, the artist (or intellectual) sees it as his or her duty
to empower the community by giving voice to the silenced. On the other hand, the state
~ Mapa~je, 1. 'Of Orality and Memory in Prison and Exile', in Anyidoho, K. (ed) (1997) op cit, p.30.
wa Thiong'o, N. (1998) Penpoints, Gunpoints, and Dreams. Oxford: Claredon Press, p.28.
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seeks to silence the truth by using its power and authority to remove or ban the truth
through laws and decrees.
Performance space therefore is defined as the "representation of being, the coming to be,
and the ceasing to be of processes of nature, human society and thought".3 Ngugi
classifies the main ingredients of performance space as comprising "content, audience,
and the goal, whose end, so to speak, could be the instruction or pleasure, or of both - in
short, some reformative effects on the audience".4 In essence, Ngugi suggests that the
arena for performance space is a battleground for the intellectual, the artist, the people,
and the state to capture an audience in order to achieve the desired objectives. In this
arena, the main struggle for performance space "is really a struggle between the power of
performance in the arts and the performance of power by the state - in short, enactments
of power".5
The neo-colonial state, like the colonial state, "Is a system of violent subjugation of one
people by another". 6 While it acts as if it is free and independent, like its predecessor it
continues to politically and economically subjugate its citizens. "The relationship
between state and society is one in which the state elites seek to control and influence the
discourse ofpolitics".7 This is achieved or legitimised through an elaborate philosophical
system that is woven in a complex and intricate web of lies and deceit. 8 The state thus
often regards its citizens as potential enemies; it seeks to control performance space and
in most cases begins to rule by the use of force, terror and intimidation. Ngugi suggest
that the ruling elite is itself ruled by fear. This fear is evidenced by the enactments of
oppressive laws.
It is argued in this chapter that the Banda regime created a 'culture of silence' in three





7 Chabal, P. (1992) op cif, p.85.
8 wa Thiong'o, N. (1998) op cif, pp21-22.
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intimidation and terror tactics. It also is argued that a 'cult of personality' around the
central figure of Banda was instrumental in establishing hegemonic control. Thus, under
the Banda regime, the 'enactments of power' were achieved by controlling performance
space through the enforcement of a series of laws that essentially and effectively silenced
internal oppositional forces. The result was the shrinkage of political and civic space.
3.2 Legal constitutional
As evidenced by the list of key amendments to the 1964 constitution enumerated in the
previous chapter, the implications were far reaching. Party and Government were
merged into a monolithic bloc of absolute power. This power bloc occupied all political
space in Malawi. Civic space was invaded and threatened by greatly diminishing the
guarantees of individual liberties. The judiciary, now under party control, provided
Banda "with the most powerful weapon to use against citizens who had, for any reason
seriously offended him".9 As mentioned earlier, parliament was silenced and reduced to
rubber-stamping executive decisions. The extent to which Banda controlled voices
within his own party is amply demonstrated by his statement: 'There is no dispute in or
party (MCP). We don't say what do you want, what is it? It is what Kamuzu says that
goes".lO He also once told the directors of the multi-national company Lonrho that,
"anything I say is law". 11
Banda's control of the voices within Malawian society is a typical characteristic of neo-
colonial rule in Africa. Ngugi comments that the more authoritarian a state is, the less
likely it is to entertain questions and criticisms. In its quest to supervise society's actions,
"a neo-colonial state tries to impose silence on the population as a whole. Quite often the
right to organize has been taken away, and people are not allowed to gather freely to
voice their thoughts".12 Banda's Malawi typifies the neo-colonial state against which
Ngugi launched his critique. As Mchombo explains, "the media and educational
9 Mhone, G. (1998) op cit, p.3.
10 Ibid, p.12.
11 Banda, speech at dinner for Lomho executives, 8 November 1963, N.I.D. press release, in Short, P.
(1974) op cit, p.254.
12 wa Thiong'o, N. (1998) op cit, p.27.
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establishments can shape the multitude of minds. As such, these institutions came under
the most intense scrutiny and were under the most intense surveillance". 13 Thus, the
control over the flow of information was of crucial importance as the longevity of Dr
Banda's dictatorship hinged on his ability to censor the words and actions of the
citizenry through coercion and repression. 14
The media came under tight control, for example, in 1968, Banda issued a Censorship
and Control of Entertainment Bill that made it an offence - one punishable by five years
imprisonment - to publish anything likely to undermine the authority of, or public
confidence in the Government. IS The Bill, under the supervision of the Malawi
Censorship Board regulated, controlled and minimized the freedom of speech and
entertainment. The Censorship Board controlled "the making and exhibition of cinema
pictures, the importation, production, dissemination and possession of undesirable
publication, pictures and records". 16 The lengths to which the state would go in order to
control the flow of information arguably is indicative of its fear of expressiveness. As
Ngugi argues, "a novel, or any narrative, may create a situation in which people are
debating the very issues forbidden in real life by the state". I?
The Censorship Act was so profound and pervasive that it extended as far as Dr Banda
controlling the press through state ownership of both the local newspaper and the
country's only radio station. However, as Chimombo argues, the greatest achievement of
the Censorship Act was in Dr Banda's ability to make one censor oneself. Dr Banda was
ingenious at creating self-censorship, so much so that:
Parliamentary debate was not even attempted. This was not only because of
the resulting loss of reflective ability by parliamentarians, but also because it
was dangerous to make a statement that might have been misinterpreted. 18
13 Mchombo, S. op cit, p.27.
14 Ibid, p.3!.
15 Cullen, T. (1994) Malawi: A Turning Point. Cambridge: The Pentland Press p 18
16 ' . •
Ibid, p.18.
17 wa Thiong'o, N. (1998) op cit, p.27.
18 Chimombo, T. (1997) op cit, p.3!.
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Even among ordinary Malawians, "the ability to suppress or conceal political views no
matter how elementary and the Malawian's inclination to censor oneself was almost
instinctive or an automatic reflexive response".19 This reflexive reaction was also
exercised out of the fear of possible misinterpretation. It was this ability of the people of
Malawi, forced into submission, to silence themselves of which one commentator wrote:
"the authoritarian, highly personalized regime (in Malawi) is proof that repression can
work".2o The consequence was a 'culture of silence' which was reflected in "the
Malawians mistrust of one's colleague at work, kith or kin".21
Along with freedom of press, academic freedom practically disappeared. The power of
the intellect, or the artist, as Ngugi explains, is often feared. Part of the reason lies in the
state's knowledge of the power of words and images. The intellectual is a threat to the
neo-colonial state because of his or her ability to expose or question the actions of the
state while simultaneously empowering people through words and images. Silencing the
intellect is thus the state's attempt to silence forms of expression. The state behaves in
such a manner because, Ngugi argues, (it) "has a narcissistic image of itself as the holder
of truth. In other words, absolute power is taken for absolute knowledge".22
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Banda made a conscious effort to discourage the
development of critical and radical discourse by declaring that certain subjects must be
taught on the basis of conditions in Malawi. Evidently, this declaration came soon after
opening up the university to undergraduate students who in an attempt to exercise their
right to intellectual freedom, and to forge an interactive relationship with the political
elements in Malawi, decided to hold a debate on whether or not the one-party system was
feasible. The students stood in opposition to one-party rule and the politicians defended
it. According to Mchombo, "interpreting this as a sign of student opposition to the one-
party state, Banda went on the attack, castigating university students as arrogant and
\9 Mhone, G. (1992) op cit, p.8.
20 Index on Censorship, April 1992, in Cullen, T. (1994) op cit, p.!.
2\ Mhone, G. (1992) op cit, p.8.
22 wa Thiong'o, N. (1998) op cit, p.16.
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presumptuous in thinking they knew everything when they were mere suckling babies".23
After this incident, the university community, like the press, was under constant
surveillance, with a significant number of academics eventually landing in detention for
unspecified acts of 'sedition'. Thus, the act of censorship, as Ngugi explains is when "the
state tries to control the distribution and consumption of the work of art",z4 But he also
adds, "When official censorship fails the state may try to induce self-censorship through
selective acts of terrorism".25 Dr Banda was insightful, perceptive and ingenious in his
methods of suppressing and silencing dissent to the extent that he employed both tactics.
I turn to the latter tactic of intimidation and terror in a later section.
In addition to press and academic censorship, censorship or castration of the independent
powers of the judiciary was exercised which, in 1969, saw the enactment of the Local
Courts (Amendment Act) that empowered Dr Banda to permit specified Traditional
Courts to try all types of criminal cases, and to pass the death sentence. It further
authorized him to direct that no appeal should be allowed from such a court to the High
Court, thereby removing the right previously guaranteed by the constitution.26 The Act
also stipulated that Africans tried in Local Courts were debarred from employing a
defence counsel. It was therefore, "to consist of traditional rulers and these rulers would
try cases according to what the president deemed to be traditional law and practice".27
Furthermore, Banda also declared that even in the High Court, he would not hesitate to
overrule a decision made by the judges. What this essentially meant was that the
judiciary in Malawi was now open to direct political control. As with all other repressive
laws implemented, this one also served the purpose of silencing Dr Banda's opponents as
in cases where he felt that an individual was a potential threat, he could use his powers to
manipulate the verdict.
23 Mchombo, S. op cif, p.28.
24 wa Thiong'o, N. (1998) op cif, p.32.
25 Ibid, p.32.
26 Short, P. (1974) op cif, p.271.
27 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cif, p.254.
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3.3 Hegemonic persuasion: 'cult of personality'
As evidenced in the various laws Banda enacted, it is arguable that Malawi under Dr
Banda's authority and command "came to attain a rare and dubious distinction of shifting
from a one-party state to a one-man state".28 Mchombo further argues, "Indeed, the post-
independence period in Malawi was marked by the extraordinary fact that all aspects of
political power came to be concentrated in the hands of one individual".29 Banda's voice,
therefore, both articulated and controlled the operations of state and society in Malawi.
Political and social discourse became aspects of the same powerful and all pervasive
voice emanating from the Presidential Residence. A 'culture of silence' in Banda's
Malawi may thus be taken as meaning that only one voice had permission to speak and
that this voice alternatively persuaded and terrified all other Malawian voices into
silence. The question to be explored in this section is: How did Malawi come to be
tyrannized by a political system dominated by one-man?
Part of the explanation draws from the creation of a fully-fledged personality cult where
Dr Banda was often portrayed as larger than life, and endowed with God-like attributes. 3o
He was even conceptualised as immortal. For example, no one knew his exact age, and
neither did Banda disclose his exact age. Perhaps, the mystery surrounding his age was
an essential aspect of Dr Banda's rule because if anyone ever discovered how old he
really was, it would hint too much at his mortality.
Mchombo highlights the extent to which hero-worship was a constant refrain of the
regime. He recalls a satirical song that illustrates the lengths to which Banda-worship
was taken. It went like this: "'Zonse zimene za Kamuzu Banda '. (Everything whatsoever
belongs to Kamuzu Banda). 'Misewu yonse, ya Kamuzu Banda' (all the roads belong to
Kamuzu Banda), 'azimayi onse, a Kamuzu Banda (all the women belong to Kamuzu
Banda), and so on".3l As Malawi's first president, and life president, this sort of utterly
28 Mchombo, S. op cit, p.2l.
29 Ibid, p.2l.
30 Chazan, N. et.al. (1988) op cit, p.lS?
31 Mchombo, S. op cit, p.2l.
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uncritical hero-worship meant that Banda no longer had to hide behind a mask. He could
be himself with impunity. Important institutions were named after him - Kamuzu
International Airport, Kamuzu Stadium, Kamuzu Bridge, Kamuzu Academy, Kamuzu
Highway, and Kamuzu Central Hospital. 32 In addition, there was also the compulsory
celebration of Kamuzu Day and His Excellency's birthday. Everywhere he went, the
party and government machines surrounded him with pomp and ceremony, and matters
of status and protocol became increasingly important. This indeed illustrates and
supports Ngugi's argument about the neo-colonial state's determination to monopolize
performance space.
The techniques of manipulation and hero-worship employed by Dr Banda are certainly
captured by Richard Sandbrook's illustration of strongmen in Africa. The use of Dr
Banda's portrait to adorn shop walls, T-shirts, and national dresses worn by women and
party loyalists eventually made it "impossible to separate the man's substance from his
image".33 It may have made it difficult for commentators to separate truth from illusion.
For instance, Williams claims that,
There does, however, appear to have been enough public acceptances of many
of Banda's policies to indicated that he has been accorded, ifnot the active
support of, at least tacit acceptance by, a substantial part of the population.34
However, Williams' point is debatable. If tacit acceptance of Banda's policies permeated
much of Malawi, why did the Banda regime consider that widespread resort to the use of
terror was a necessary feature of regime survival?
3.4 Intimidation and terror
When oppressive laws and 'cult of personality' propaganda failed to create a 'culture of
silence', the regime resorted to its bottom line. Mchombo eloquently expresses why the
use of physical threat as a method of control was part and parcel of the Banda regime.
He explains that, "Banda viewed the nation as an extension of his household and ruled it
32 Cullen, T. (1994) op cif, p.17.
33 Short, P. (1974) op cif, p.282.
34 Williams, T. D. (1978) op cif, p.16.
61
as though he were ruling a family compound, as his actions and choice of words
indicated".35 This is why "the security of the country and that of its leader became
intertwined and increasingly the focus of domestic affairs".36 Any act interpreted as
capable of undermining his authority and leadership meant that heavy penalties for
dissent would be paid through detention, exile or worse yet, death. Moreover, heavy
penalties for dissent were exercised with a bewildering and terrifying degree of
arbitrariness.
To achieve such levels of control, Banda required legal methods. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the re-enactment of the Preventative Detention Bill in 1965 provided
the legal framework for arrest and detention without trial. However, the creation of
watchdog institutions that would enforce obedience and loyalty was paramount in terms
of enforcing silence. The Malawi Police and the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) were
the chosen bodies that would enforce law and order. Both these institutions were given
discretionary powers such that, for example, "the Malawi Police were not obliged to
publish names and numbers of the people they had detained". 37 As such, their detention
powers were completely arbitrary, a vital component in spreading a climate of terrified
silence throughout Malawi's civic spaces.
One particularly notorious crime committed by the Malawi Police stands out above the
rest and serves to show the length and measures Banda would take to ensure that his
power was never compromised. The incident that comes to the mind of most Malawians
when they reflect back on the atrocities committed by the Banda regime is, the 'Mwanza
Accident' when in 1983 four senior cabinet ministers were found dead in a saloon vehicle
in the remote district of Mwanza. These killings, based on the orders of the president,
were carried out because Dr Banda perceived these ministers as being rivals for his
position and therefore, they had rebelled against him and needed to be effectively
muted.
38
This is a classic example in which Dr Banda, through his ability to deploy
35 Mchombo, S. op cif, p.24.
36 Ibid, p.23.
37 Cullen, T. (1994) op cif, p.16.
38 Venter, D. 'Malawi: the transition to multi-party politics', in Wiseman, J. A. (ed) (1995) op cif, p.155.
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insunnountable levels of power and control, was in a position to spread terror through the
ranks of potential political opposition and thus to drastically reduce political space as
well as civic space.
The Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) were the most ruthless enforcers of discipline in
Malawi, and developed into a paramilitary wing that "protected national security through
activities such as enforcing the purchase ofMCP annual membership cards, and attacking
property of individuals suspected of having links with dissidents".39 For example, violent
acts committed against the Malawian people by the MYP included the hunting down of,
and killing, sexually assaulting, driving into exile, dismembering and murdering of
Jehovah's Witnesses because of "their unwillingness to acknowledge secular authority
and their resistance to purchasing MCP cards".4o Jack Mapanje, one of many Malawian
academics who were arbitrarily imprisoned by the Banda regime, recalls that even
Special Branch feared to take action against officials who were under the protection of
the MYP.41 Mapanje also notes that "the Malawian intelligence had learned its
disinfonnation tricks from apartheid South Africa".42 This reliance on apartheid
expertise in the dissemination of terror and misinfonnation indeed signifies the neo-
colonial status of Banda's Malawi.
39 Mchombo, S. op cif, p.24.
40 Ibid, p.24.
41 Mapanje, 1. op cif, p.33.
42 Ibid, p.39.
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SECTION TWO: MALAWI'S TRANSITION FROM NEO-COLONIALISM:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUALISING CIVIL SOCIETY
4.1 Introduction
As indicated in the previous chapter, this dissertation conceptualises a transition from a
neo-colonial order to another form of governance in terms of the opening up of political
and civic space in order to enable "a clamour of voices" to be heard. As previously
demonstrated, in neo-colonial Malawi all political space and much of civic space had
been narrowed to the point where one voice (that of Banda or his mouthpieces l ) spoke in
the name of all Malawians. This dissertation therefore argues that it is possible and
desirable to assess the extent of meaningful or substantive change in present day Malawi
by an interrogation of the extent if any to which 'a culture of silence' is in transition to a
'clamour of voices', in other words, the extent, if any to which Malawians are being
enabled to speak out and be heard. This dissertation infers 'be heard' to mean in a
statutory (constitutional), judicial and policy-making manner in terms of the penetration
of voices in the arena of the Malawian state.
It is important to reiterate three points made earlier in the introduction to the dissertation.
Firstly, the dissertation does not try to delineate and analyse democracy in the new form
of the Malawian state (that is since 1994f Instead, the concept of 'transition' is utilized
to indicate that Malawians are still in a process of emerging from a neo-colonial
dispensation, and that the process is on going. Secondly, instead of examining
institutions and process of 'high politics' as a way of measuring the transition, this
dissertation utilizes the concept of 'politics from below' or (following Ngugi) 'voices
from below'. To do this, the dissertation interrogates society in its organized form, in
I Banda's mouthpieces consisted of, himself, his right hand man, John Tembo, and his constant companion
and 'official hostess' Cecilia Kadzamira, they were dubbed the 'Triumvirate' and were believed to be the
only two people permitted to speak with authority in his name.
2 Instead of pinning the concept 'democracy', down to a single defInition, I left it to my informants to
articulate their perceptions of democracy in today's Malawi; material relating to current democratic
dispensations is compiled and compared in the data analysis that follows on from this chapter.
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other words, utilizes a civil society paradigm within which to organize and interpret the
qualitative analysis which comprises the second section. To this end, an adumbration of
civil society discourse in Africa in general, and Malawi in particular, is needed to set the
scene for the qualitative analysis that follows. Also, the paradigm then is limited and
refined to accommodate the selected civil society organizations and communities which
comprise the specific voices which are heard in this dissertation.
4.2 Discourse on civil society in Africa
According to Mamdani,
The notion of civil society came into prominence with the Eastern
European uprisings of the late 1980s. These events were taken as
signalling a paradigmatic shift from a state-centred perspective, from
a strategy of armed struggle that seeks to capture state power to one of an
unarmed civil struggle that seeks to create self-limiting power. 3
The significance of these events caused Africanists to reconsider the concept of civil
society in Africa in light of what Samuel Huntington termed the 'third wave' of
democratisation.4 As a result of the changes on the African continent, Mamdani
distinguishes between conflicting tendencies in civil society discourse in Africa. In the
literature that is 'modernist', inspiration is drawn from events in Eastern Europe, and in
the literature that is 'communitarian', inspiration is drawn from "real flesh-and-blood
communities that comprise Africa (and) are marginalized from public life as so many
'tribes",.5
Ake extends the 'communitarian' point when he contends that we cannot understand civil
society in Africa without coming to terms with ethnicity and ethnic diversities. He
argues that ethnicity is linked to the existence of civil society and its vitality. Ake thus
defines civil society as "the realm of associational life, credited with checking the
3 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.14.
4 Huntington, S. cited in Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1996) 'Civil Society in Africa'. Journal ofDemocracy, Vol, 7,
No. 2, p1l8.
5 Mamdani, M. (1996) op cif, p.3.
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totalitarian tendencies of state power by pluralism which is its very essence".6 He further
argues that because political authoritarianism in Africa was often associated with
personal rule and reliance on an ethnic political base, and because of the way that
repressive domination was organized, opposition to state authoritarianism tended to be
based around ethnic formations. Ake therefore takes a positive view of ethnicity in a
civil society context, which is comparable with Mamdani's notion of communitarianism.
However, at this juncture it is important to note that the qualitative research which
follows this chapter, does not involve ethnic organizations. Ake's and Mamdani's
arguments about ethnic formations are included to demonstrate an awareness of the
literature on African civil society and how the struggle that existed and exists between
state and society in Africa comprises a whole range of different civic associations, not all
of which fit Western or 'liberal' conceptions of civil society organizations.
In order to trace the roots of the struggle and the analysis of the relationship that existed
between state and society, Chabal contributes to the discourse by highlighting the fact
that "independence was a rapture, a political revolution, in the relationship between the
state and civil society".7 He explains that, "the very fact that the nationalists were now in
power changed the configuration of civil society and the nature of the relationship
between the state and civil society".8 What was distinctive Cl.bout the relationship
between civil society and the state was that the new African leaders "defined the
boundaries and activities of civil society so that the political actions of civil society were
almost confined to the realm of political illegitimacy".9 The new relationship between
the state and civil society was one in which state elites sought to control and influence the
discourse of politics through various constitutional amendments, which resulted in "the
narrowing down of representation, the increase in coercion and the greater
bureaucratisation of civil society".10 The voice of civil society became more subdued, if
not altogether silenced. Civil society discourse under neo-colonial regimes, at least,
~ Ake, C. (1993) What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa. Transformation, Vol. 22, p.6.
Chabal, P. (1992) op cit, p.89.
8 Ibid, p.90.
9 Bayart, 1. F. (1979) 'L 'Etat au Cameroun', cited in Chabal, P. op cit, p.85.
10 Chabal, P. op cit, p.91.
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appeared to be dictated by the discourse of high politics.1I Therefore it may be inferred
that an important process of transition from neo-colonialism is that of liberating civil
society's voices from state control. However, as Chabal argues, "this is not to say that
civil society speaks with one voice for it is divided into a myriad of individuals or
ensembles of individuals each with its own voice".12
In a slightly different vein to Chabal' s, Monga argues that,
People are becoming more and more aware of belonging to a specific, defined
group and increasingly express the desire to create interest groups in both
civil and political arenas. From political courtiers to financial marabouts,
from unemployed youths of the suburbs to the intellectual and religious
elites, there is hardly a group that has not felt the need for its members to
communally articulate their daily concerns. 13
In the above quotation, Monga indicates the expansive boundaries of civil society
discourse in the struggle against neo-colonialism. He further argues that although civil
society may not speak with one voice, "For Africans, these groups are a way of
reclaiming their rights of self-expression, long confiscated by the official institutions of
power".14 He emphasizes that civil society in Africa cannot be understood unless it is
seen within the perspective of what he terms an 'anthropology of anger,.15 What does
Monga mean by 'anger' in a civil society context? His meaning relates to the effects on
the lives of ordinary Africans of neo-colonial states and governance. Here, his
perspective is similar to Ngugi's. He refers to "the emotional dimension of the protest
movements that have been shaking Africa's political stage,,16, to "to cumulative
frustrations"l? and to "collective modes of expression and discontent".18 What Monga
highlights, therefore, is that civil society discourse in Africa today continues to be
influenced by people's experiences of neo-colonialism. Thus, like Mamdani and Ake,
I1 Ibid, p.8S.
12 Ibid, p84.
13 Monga, C. (1996) The Anthropology of Anger: Civil society and Democracy in Africa. Boulder, London:







Monga argues for a reconceptualisation of civil society m accordance with African
historicity. As such, he states,
Any attempt to define the forces hastily grouped under the label civil
society appears doomed. This is principally due to the diversity of
political situations and the inherent inadequacy of using tools designed
for understanding the workings of Western democracies to analyse the
situation elsewhere in the world, which raises the general problem arising
from the transfer of concepts across time and space. 19
In line with Monga's argument, Bayart explains why difficulties exist with the transfer of
concepts across geographical locations. He discusses the differences between European
and African history in terms of the emergence of the state in both areas. For instance, he
argues that the state in Europe emerged as an excrescence that developed in and upon
society whereas, in Africa, the state did not develop in and upon society. Instead, the
type of state that emerged in Africa was imposed and created by colonial rule. Thus, he
argues, the relationship that developed between civil society and the state was one in
which civil society experienced continual conflict with and domination by the state
because the state had been deliberately set up against civil society.2o
As can be seen from the outline above of some influential aspects of civil society
discourse in Africa, it is a contested field of analysis, and is difficult to define with
precision, at least in regards the theory of the concept. An alternative method is to collect
and document perceptions of civil society through in-depth interviews with civil society
activists, well-informed citizens (in the academic community in the case of this
dissertation). This dissertation utilizes a qualitative method of in-depth interviews with a
range of informants to obtain definitions from the people on the ground. However, in
general terms and from personal observation, civil society can be conceptualised and
understood as organizations that are non-governmental whose main aims are neither to
generate profits nor to seek governing power. Thus, it has no particular interest or
ambition to replace the incumbent government, but has an intention (if deemed
19 Ibid, p.145.
20 Bayart, 1. F. 'Civil Society in Africa', in Chabal, P. (ed) (1986) Political Domination in Africa.





necessary) to influence processes of governance such as policy and legislation. In short,
it comprises organized associationallife that is outside of government and often occupies
the space between the citizen and the state, where the will of citizens' is manifested and
mobilized outside officialdom.
4.3 The parameters of qualitative analysis
For the purposes of this dissertation, and in particular the qualitative analysis, 'civil
society' is understood in terms of:
• Malawi's protracted experience ofneo-colonialism and a 'culture of silence'.
• The important role played by civil society, especially religious organizations, in
challenging and defeating the Banda regime.
• The vital role of civil society in combating on-going neo-colonial tendencies of
'high politics' as well as establishing and maintaining constructive dialogue with
government.
• 'Voices'. It is the aim of this dissertation to allow and enable Malawian voices to
speak for themselves. Therefore, definitions of civil society and its role are
definitions of informants.
• This dissertation privileges the voices of three selected groups or communities
within Malawian society.21 One reason is due to constraints of time and access.
Other reasons are given in the course of data analysis provided in the chapter to
follow.
Having outlined the parameters of analysis in this section of the dissertation, a remaining
task is to highlight relevant aspects of associational and organizational life in Malawi in
the period of 1964 to 1994, and to note important contributions in the field of opposition
to neo-colonialism.
21 These are: organizations of the Roman Catholic Church, Gender Empowerment organizations and the
intellectual or academic community of Chancellor College.
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4.4 Civil Society in Malawi
It should be stated right from the outset that the literature of civil society in Malawi is
relatively small for the very reason that the neo-colonial state under Dr Banda censored
academic discourse and also shut down, disbanded or assimilated into the party (co-
opted) most civil society organizations. However, Chirwa and Ngwira note that "during
the colonial period a vast array of 'native associations', welfare societies, trade and
worker unions, producer and consumer co-operatives, independent churches and socio-
cultural organizations emerged".22 Furthermore, not only did they exist, these more or
less independent organizations and institutions eventually were incorporated into the
nationalist movement during the struggle to end colonial rule. This incorporation of
independent organizations arguably aided in shaping the country's political future and the
relationship between state and civil society during the colonial and neo-colonial eras.
However, after independence from colonial rule in 1964, most of the institutions and
organizations of civil society were incorporated into party-structures. Trade unions and
other sources of opposition, which the MCP perceived as threats to their power, had their
autonomy undermined. Moreover, various other organizations that were perceived as
existing outside the party were actively suppressed, disbanded and shut down in the
regime's attempt to control all facets of Malawian life. Civil society was therefore
drastically weakened, and the co-optation or suppression of civil society served the
regime's objectives: namely, in damaging and restricting the cultivation of a democratic
culture and polity, thus neutralizing potential sites or sources of resistance.
The process of enfeebling civil society was aided by outside forces. As Minnis notes,
"thanks to the array of international donors that continued to pump money into anti-
Socialist Malawi throughout the period, they indirectly aided and abetted Dr Banda's
attempt to 'hegemonise' civil society".23 During the era of the Cold War, therefore, the
role of the West served to complement Dr Banda's quest to co-opt or suppress centres of
dissent and opposition.
22 Chirwa, W. & Ngwira, N. (1998) 'State of the Art Review - Malawi', in Lawson, M. (2000) Civil
Society in Malawi. OD Debate, VoI. 7, p.6.
23 Minnis, J. R. 'Prospects and Problems for Civil Society in Malawi', in Lawson, M. (2000) op cit, p.6.
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Despite the initiatives and activities of the neo-colonial regIme, some civil society
organizations survived, although in a weakened form. Most of these associations
however, were engaged in seemingly non-threatening activities such as developmental,
charitable and social services organizations. As Lawson notes, "the ability of these
organizations to continue their operations was possible because they remained studiously
apolitical and stuck closely to a welfare-oriented approach with no emphasis on
community mobilization".24 Most were religious based organizations that were vital to
Malawi's community development projects because they either provided healthcare or
humanitarian relief services. For example, the Christian Health Association of Malawi
(CHAM) ran 40% of the country's healthcare services, and the Christian Services
Committee (CSC), a 30-year-old church welfare organization, were indispensable to
Malawi's non-governmental services. However, although some organizations did
survive, the nature of the relationship between state and society under Dr Banda was
characterized by mistrust and fear.
As Lawson explains, the re-emergence of civil society (in terms of NGO operations in
Malawi in the transitional period) was aided by the Mozambican civil war where Malawi
experienced an influx of Mozambican refugees.25 The flood of refugees proved to
difficult to cope with, and the Malawian government called for humanitarian assistance,
which drew attention from around the world. By 1993, when the civil war in
Mozambique came to an end, and the refugees had been sent back home, a number of
International NGOs decided to remain instead of closing down their operations in
Malawi. They focused their efforts on humanitarian issues such as development, the
provision of safe, portable water, and concentrated on food security programs. Their
operations remained legal as they stuck to apolitical community services. However, at
the same time, their presence acted as a catalyst and played a crucial role in carving out a
space for civil society in Malawi. Inspired by their example, a number of local NGOs
24 Lawson, M. (2000) op cif, p.6.
25 Ibid, p.46.
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started to develop; even so, for the time being, NGOs continued to take an unthreatening
role by confining their efforts to assisting communities.
It is of note that Malawi provides a cameo example of the paradoxical role of the West.
With the ending of the Cold War came an alteration in Western strategic considerations
such that blatant neo-colonialism in donor Africa could no longer rely on Western
support. Thus, the influence of international financial institutions played a role in carving
out space for the re-emergence of an active civil society. In the late 1980s and early 90s,
international donors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund began
to push for economic and political reforms. As mentioned, one of the prime reasons for
advocating political and economic liberalization was the demise of the Soviet bloc, the
end of the Cold War and the 'triumph' of the West. Western 'triumphalism' arguably
played a significant role in what Samuel Huntington termed the 'third-wave' of
democratisation?6 In light of global changes, dictatorial regimes increasingly became
perceived as antiquated, and as Monga notes, African dictators were no longer able "to
sell to the international community the ludicrous idea that the future of Africa depended
on them and them alone".27 As such, pressure from international financial institutions,
followed by the conditionalities now attached to aid from donor countries, indicated to
observers and analysts of African politics and society that the writing was on the wall for
single party regimes. Through an incredible reversal of fortune, many African dictators,
like Banda, were losing their strength and grip and "were toppling over like bowling
pins".28 However, in Malawi, the demise of Banda and his single party regime cannot be
solely attributed to international pressure. The contribution made by civil society
movements, not least under the constituents of religious based organizations, was a major
and significant factor in internal pressure for reform.
26 Huntington, S. cited in Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1996) Civil Society in Africa. Journal ofDemocracy, Vol. 7,
No. 2, p.118.
27 Monga, C (1996) op cit, p.47.
28 Ibid.
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4.4.1 Immediate events of transition from neo-colonialism
It should be noted and clarified at this point in the dissertation's argument that the
method utilized is to divide 'transition' into two stages. The first is the 'immediate' state,
that is, significant events and actions taken between 1992 and 1994 (the first multi-party
elections). The second stage is conceptualised as the on-going process of transition,
including threatened setbacks (such as the President's attempt to extend his tenure
beyond constitutional limits). An objective of the qualitative research is to highlight
some of the ambiguities and nuances of the second stage, and to highlight also that many
decades of neo-colonial rule have left a deep imprint on Malawian society, not easily
done away with.
In 1992, Roman Catholic Bishops wrote a Pastoral Letter, which is marked as a
watershed event in the country's history of thirty years of silence from society. The letter
was distributed around the Church Parishes throughout the country, and the contents of
the letter openly criticised and highlighted both political repression and the
mismanagement of the economy. It was arguably a groundbreaking event in the
country's long history of autocratic rule. However, the broken silence raised an
important question: why had it taken the Catholic Church so long to publicly announce
their dissatisfaction with the Banda regime? Minnis furnishes a plausible if partial
explanation. He writes: "The reasons for the clergy's silence can be understood if one
considers that in order for any organization to operate in Malawi, maintaining good
relations with the Banda regime was paramount".29
While noting Minnis' explanation, this dissertation does not suggest that it is sufficient to
explain the 'quietism' and passivity of the Church in Malawi. However, no matter how
long it took, at least it revealed a deep sense of frustration and dissatisfaction with the
Banda regime. As the Chairman of the Committee involved in composing this letter
stated: "Among the Christian communities in Malawi, there was a growing realization
29 Minnis, 1. R. 'Prospects and Problems of Civil Society in Malawi', in Phiri, K. M. & Ross, K. R. (ed)
(1998) op cit, p.141.
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that issues of human rights and of justice were integral to the gospel message".30 Having
decided to speak out on matters that needed to be addressed, the Bishops listed several
areas of concern. Among some of the issues raised was the increase in poverty for the
majority of Malawians, the spread of corruption, the basic freedoms that had been denied,
and the basic injustices that the government had committed against ordinary Malawians.31
The letter ended with an appeal to all Christians in Malawi to "respond to this state of
affairs and work towards a change of climate".32
The government's response to the Pastoral letter lends substance to Minnis' explanation
above because it illustrates the courage need to withstand the neo-colonial regime. The
regime, in a classic example of neo-colonial 'double-speak', condemned the Bishops for
trying to incite violence and destroy the peace and stability that Malawi had enjoyed for
thirty years33 . Following the release of the Pastoral letter, the seven Bishops of Malawi
were arrested, detained and interrogated. Plots and threats to kill them were circulated.
However, contrary to the government's efforts to contain the situation, their threats
served to fuel opposition movements internally. Students and workers rallied behind the
Bishops in support of the letter, and made calls for political reform. In addition, the
international community expressed its concern and demanded that Dr Banda hasten the
reform process or face losing international aid.
By mid-1992, the climate of fear was under attack by the very people it previously had
silenced. The people of Malawi were taking to the streets of Blantyre, Lilongwe and
Zomba, demanding that Dr Banda institute a referendum in which a now active electorate
would vote for multi-party or single-party rule. Thus, it is arguable that the Bishops letter
served as a catalyst, and played a pivotal role in the call for change. Various people,
highlighting the impact of the Pastoral letter, issued comments. For example, Reverend
Aaron Longwe of the Church of the Central African Presbyterian (CCAP) expressed that
the letter "represented the feelings of the people of Malawi. It spoke on our behalf and
30 Six drafting committee members had responsibility for writing the letter, in Cullen, T. (1994) op cit,
p.34.




became the voice of the voiceless".34 Jack Mapanje, the country's leading writer and
poet, who had relocated to Britain after his release from detention, spoke out from exile:
"Malawians need opposition from within the country and the Bishop's letter must be seen
as a turning point in the build up of opposition that preceded it".35 Pressure groups
emerged by mid 1992 and later registered themselves as political parties.36 During this
period, Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) and the United Democratic Front (OOF) were
formed to agitate for change. Both groups had one common aim, "the suspension of the
Constitution's Article 4 which enshrined the status of the MCP as the sole legal party".37
The withdrawal of that clause was essential for the opening up of political space in
Malawi. Where was Malawian civil society amidst all this 'clamour of voices'?
Lawson argues that, with the political changes taking place from the early 1990s,
institutions and organizations of civil society emerged from nowhere, yet their efficacy
was hampered due to colonial and neo-colonial legacies. He further argues that these
eras had considerable bearing on the development of an effective and coherent civil
society.38 The culture of suppression and oppression had severely restricted the creation
of an open society and non-fearful voices. Even in the era of political change or
transition, the culture of silence was by no means completely erased. However, under the
new political dispensation, what became evident was that space was arduously being
opened for the development of a strong civil society that aimed at opening up the political
system and providing checks and balances on the state. The growth of civil society in
Malawi is evidenced by the fact that within few years, 200 NGOs were operational in the
country, each with a different focus point. 39 However, the most notable organizations in
this respect were the NGOs dealing with human and civil rights as it was felt that the
34 Ibid, p.47.
35 Ibid, p.47.
36 Pressure groups were able to register themselves as political parties during the second half of 1992 and
the first half of 1993. The ambiguities introduced by this blurring of boundaries between civic (pressure
groups) and political (opposition parties) space is highlighted by respondents from the focus group
interviews cited in the data analysis section.
37 V' "' th I . thlctOry lor e mu tt-party pressure groups on the 14 June 1993 referendum forced the government to
change the constitution on 28th June 1993, to allow the presence of opposition parties within the country.
See Cullen, T. (1994) op cif, p.58.
38 Lawson, M. (2000) op cif, p.7.
39 See Lawson, M. (2000) op cif, p.7.
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country needed to redress such abuses before it could move on. Since then, other civil
society organizations have mushroomed, each catering for the specific needs of social
groups or communities.
In concluding this chapter, it is reiterated that the qualitative analysis, which follows, was
undertaken in the form of fairly extensive and in-depth interviews, conducted during the
months of June and July 2002. The collation and analysis of data, attitudes and
perspectives of respondents thus relates to a second and on-going phase of transition from
neo-colonialism in Malawi, complete with lingering features of neo-colonial governance
and mentalities, and perceived setbacks in the context of 'voice' and 'space'.
I now turn to delineating the three strata of civil society organizations and communities
interviewed by myself as part of the research for this dissertation. The objective is to
examine and analyse the effects of liberalization on a 'culture of silence'. More
specifically, a fully empirical interrogation of two selected groups of civil society, plus an
umbrella organization, examines to what extent civil society in Malawi is currently
involved in dismantling the 'culture of silence' and is providing an enabling space for a
'clamour of voices'. The overall objective is to unpack the activities and trends of
selected civil society organizations in their capacity as independent actors engaged in the
expansion and mobilisation of civic and political space. In addition, qualitative analysis
drawing on a variety of academic voices is included. The respondents in this group are
well-informed, articulate and insightful 'voices' within the overall context of Malawian
society emerging from long decades of neo-colonially enforced silence.
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CHAPTER FIVE: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: 'FROM A CULTURE OF
SILENCE TO A CLAMOUR OF VOICES?' - INTRODUCTION
5.1 Research Methodology
The study used a purposeful sampling approach to collect data. 1 In practice this was
done through in-depth interviews. Hence, the study saw religious organizations,
women's organizations and the intellectual community as part and parcel of civil
society and as key informants for the in-depth investigation in assessing the extent of
meaningful or substantive change in present day Malawi. The methods of research
are qualitative and this dissertation takes a naturalistic approach to data collection.
This is because during the course of interviewing key informants, I did not attempt to
manipulate the research setting. As such, to compliment the naturalistic approach, I
formulated open-ended questions in order to minimize the imposition of pre-
determined responses. The intention was to enable informants to talk openly and
fairly about their feelings, experiences, opinions and knowledge.
5.2 Data collection
As mentioned in the prevIOus chapter, data collection was carried out during the
months of June and July 2002. Appointments to conduct interviews were done either
telephonically or through e-mail. Once informants indicated their willingness to
participate in the study, an abstract was delivered along with samples of the
appropriate interview guide.2 Through this process 24 key informants were identified
and interviewed.
All key informants had a reasonable understanding of what the study sought to
examine. However, the positions in the three selected bodies of civil society
comprised a variety of professions, and ranks within the professions. Church
informants included parish priests, a pastoral secretary and ordinary priests, all from
1 "The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth
study. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central
importance to the purpose of the research". Patton, M. (1990) Qualitative Evaluation and Research
Methods. London: SAGE Publications, p.169.
2 The interview guides were structured in an open-ended manner. This meant that once the informant
gave an answer to a question, further questions related to his/her response were asked either to engage
the mformant m m-depth dIscussion or to seek clarification or expansion.
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different parishes. In the women's organizations, informants included, the national
co-ordinator of Women and Law in Malawi, the legal programme officer for Women
and Law, the programme officer for Women and Law and the full-time research
assistant for Women and Law in Malawi. Also, a focus group interview included
informants from Women's Voice. In the intellectual community, academics
interviewed included members of staff from the Departments of Sociology,
Philosophy and Public Administration and Political Studies, ranging in rank from
Professorial to lecturer.
Out of the 24 people interviewed, 19 were individually interviewed and 5 were
interviewed as part of a focus group.3 Due to problematics of time and access, only
one focus-group interview was conducted and this was with a woman's organization
known as Women's Voice. In addition, of the 19 informants interviewed
individually, 1 of the key informants was from the umbrella organization the Council
for Non-Governmental Organizations of Malawi (CONGOMA). CONGOMA was
selected for the purposes of obtaining a broad overview on the role and objectives of
civil society organizations in Malawi, as well as some statistical data.
5.3 Data analysis
The specific type of data analysis utilized in this dissertation is inductive analysis.
Patton defines inductive analysis as a process that involves analysing the "patterns,
themes and categories that come out of the data".4 What this means is that by
analysing patterns and themes, interpretations can be arrived at through a process of
identifying the extent to which the information gathered can be held together or
dovetailed in a meaningful way. Moreover, where several themes emerge, prioritising
which information is imperative as it determines which issues are salient. 5 A process
of fleshing out patterns provided in the transcripts, and then making connections,
which form bridges between patterns in order to interpret the information in a more
meaningful manner does this. Furthermore, quotes from the transcripts are included
to substantiate interpretations thus clarifying the basis of inferences made. Where
3 The purpose of the focus group was to obtain different opinions and aspects that perhaps did not
emerge from the interviews conducted on an individual basis.
4 Patton, M. (1990) op cit, p.376.
5 Ibid, pA03.
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differences emerge and are bold and clear, the interpretations highlight different
points of views from the key informants.
5.4 Ethical issues
Because qualitative research methods are highly personal and inter-
personal, because naturalistic inquiry takes the researcher into the real
world where people live and work, and because in-depth interviewing
opens up what is inside people - qualitative inquiry may be more
intrusive and involve greater reactivity than surveys, tests and other
quantitative approaches.6
As such, the code of conduct on the part of the researcher is important. I am aware of
the ethical issues concerning qualitative research and the use of in-depth interviews.
More sp'ecifically, before I began conducting interviews I made sure that:
• The informants were given ample information on the objectives of the study,
and hence, made informed and voluntary decisions to participate. In short, I
made sure that all the interviews were conducted with the informed consent of
the interviewees. Additionally, informants were given the option to state their
names for transcription purposes or to remain anonymous.
• In addition, I treated all informants with courtesy and respect and assured
them that the data collected would be treated with the utmost confidentiality.
However, I did stipulate that where appropriate, their ideas would be used and
they would be quoted and cited.
• I also assured them that all the information gathered would not be misused in




5.5 Arguments explaining and supporting the choice of three distinct groups
within the broad spectrum of civic organizations and communities in
Malawi
At the outset it should be acknowledged that the groups selected comprised
informants to whom the researcher had access, and who were willing to participate.
Owing to time constraints, this practical factor was somewhat influential.
5.5.1 The religious community
In a lecture given in the early 1990s entitled 'Africa's Pro-Democracy Movements:
Indigenous, Islamic and Christian Tendencies', Ali Mazuri argued, "Religion is a
probable mid-wife to the new African democracy, religion is thus becoming one of
the roots of Africa's second liberation struggle".? Indeed, this was the case across
most of the African continent as many significant contributors to change came from
Christian organizations. For example, in Kenya, Church organizations have been at
the forefront of opposition to the authoritarian nature of Daniel arap Moi's regime.8
In Malawi, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Roman Catholic Church was
instrumental in the ousting of the Banda regime. Therefore, reasons for choosing the
faith community are as follows: firstly, because of its dramatic change from passivity
and quietism, to leading the struggle by providing the first civic and collective voice
in Malawi to speak out against neo-colonial oppression. Secondly, the faith
community is an active part of civil society especially in the way its protagonists
influence political discourse. As has been suggested by Gyimah-Boadi,
'Orthodox' Christian Churches appear to have a political commitment
to political liberalization and civic virtues. As such, they are important
parts of Africa's nascent civil society, capable of breaking the 'culture
of silence' imposed by years of authoritarian rule.9
Arguably the most vocal civil society organization in Malawi today, the religious
community provides a medium through which the extent of meaningful change in
Malawi can be interrogated.
7 Mazuri, A. 'Africa's Pro-Democracy Movements: Indigenous, Islamic and Christian Tendencies'.
The Sixth Desmond Tutu Peace Lecture. 2 December 1990, Johannesburg, p.79.
8 Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1996) op cif, p. 119.
9 Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1997) 'Civil Society in Africa: the good, the bad, the ugly'. Journal, Vol. 1, No.
1, pA. in http://www.civnet.orgijoumal/issue1/egboadi.html
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5.5.2 The women's organizations
The researcher for a number of reasons privileges gender empowerment groups. One
reason is that historically and on going, women are an oppressed group in Africa as in
other continents. However, in Africa, women are arguably more oppressed due to
neo-colonial forces of patriarchy, culture, religion, economic and educational
discrimination. Another reason is the numerical significance of women. In terms of
sheer numbers, "women make up 52% of Malawi's 12 million population",1O and
"87.9% of them are poor"." Of interest here is the role of "an African focused
intelligentsia",12 in this case, the role of the relatively few educated and articulate
women in Malawian society in empowering the majority of illiterate, poor and rural
women. However, while the educated, professional women cannot claim (unelected)
leadership of their rural sisters, they can raise levels of civic awareness, especially in
the area of civic and gender rights (protected by statute), and help to create an
enabling and empowering environment. An examination into women's organizations
is therefore of great importance because as Williams put it: "women are not a voice,
they are many voices and these voices must be given a chance to express the diversity
of opinions". 13 Thus, one of the main reasons for choosing women's organizations is
to highlight that to some extent - arguably - the status of women in any given society
is a measure of that society's openness, or otherwise. The position of women in both
colonial and neo-colonial Malawi is an area of particular concern. As Pat Williams
highlights,
From findings, African women have been playing the role they have
always played from time immemorial, whether it was in the case of
countries like Ghana and Nigeria which got 'flag' independence on a
platter of gold, or those like Algeria and Kenya which won theirs through
sweat and blood, they are the producers and reproducers of society. The
outcome for women remains the same. In times of dire need such as
the struggle for independence, women are allowed to participate in
public matters. However, as soon as the objectives have been
achieved, women are discarded like a bad penny. 14
10 Gama, H. 'Malawi: Not tonight, darling'. New African, Issue No. 406, p.13.
11 'The State of Malawi's Poor: who are they?' Poverty Monitoring System, PMS Policy Brief No.
November 2000, in http://www.nso.malawi.net/
12 Mamdani, M. 'There can be no African Renaissance without an African focused Intelligentsia. Text
of a talk delivered at the African Renaissance Conference. 28 September 1998, Johannesburg.
13 Williams, P. 'State, Women and Democratisation in Africa: The Nigerian Experience', in Nnoli, O.
(ed) (2000) Government and Politics - A Reader. Harare: AAPS Books, p.696.
14 Ibid, p.662.
81
While noting Williams' argument, this dissertation does not suggest that it is
sufficient to define the role of women as merely producers and reproducers of society.
In fact, today, a growing number of women are active participants in public arenas.
However, four decades later, with the 'second liberation' notionally having been
achieved in Malawi, it is pertinent to investigate women's attitudes and opinions
about the significance, if any, of political reform since 1995s constitutional changes,
and to uncover opinions about the extent to which women's voices are being heard by
policy-makers.
5.5.3 The intellectual community
I chose this community not least because they were viewed by Banda's regime as
exceptionally threatening. They were subjected to stringent controls and censorship.
As Mapanje notes, "here anything that made you conspicuous was abhorred.
Anything you accomplished on your own terms threatened the image of His
Excellency the Life President or the image of the country".15 Mapanje a former
academic at Chancellor College, was detained by the Banda regime and has first hand
experience of persecution and the silencing of Malawi's intellectuals. His reflections
on prison existence make poignant and painful reading. Therefore, it is argued that
the way in which in post-Banda Malawi, the intellectual community has started to
speak out on Malawian politics and society (as demonstrated by the interview
transcripts) is a hopeful and healthy sign. It is argued that these transcripts of
informed and articulate voices are essential in grasping a valuable process of
insightful discourse emerging in Malawi. Additionally, the writing and arguments of
Ngugi alert his reader to the significance of critical intellectual discourse in
interrogating narratives of power and oppression in neo-colonial states, and therefore
to the significant role intellectuals can play as guardians and interpreters of 'space'
and 'voice' in the process of transition from neo-colonialism.
15 Mapanje, J. 'Containing Cockroaches', in Anyidoho, K. (ed) (1997) op cif, p.53.
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CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
6.1 Organization of data
The interview guides were formulated in a way which enables interrogation of the
dissertation's theoretical framework and thematic content. Interview guides are not
uniform, however. Informants from each group were asked to respond to questions
that targeted their specific experience and expertise within a Malawian context of
transition from neo-colonialism. 1
6.1.1 Broad themes
Interrogation of broad themes such as perceptions of a 'culture of silence' in neo-
colonial Malawi, as well as perceptions of the extent, or otherwise, that a 'clamour of
voices' now is emerging to fill the silence, apply to all targeted groups and informants
within each group. Such themes are explicated first, and the responses of informants
are collated and analysed under the appropriate thematic headings.
6.1.2 Specific group and informant related themes
Within each interview guide are questions which target the experience and expertise
of informants within a specific group, as well as their perceived contributions to
Malawi's process of transition from neo-colonialism. For example, academic
informants are asked to estimate the extent to which Malawi fits the neo-colonial
paradigm, and also to estimate the extent to which academic freedom has been
restored, and critical discourse enabled. Representatives of the religious community
are asked to express their attitudes to issues of social and economic justice in Malawi
and whether or not such issues are, or should be a Church priority. Women
informants are asked to estimate to what extent are urban and rural women speaking
out, and if they are, the extent to which their concerns are being addressed in the
I It should be noted when the researcher started analysing the results of the research in the text she
replaced each informants name with a number. The academics are initialised as "A", women from the
Woman and Law organization are initialised as '8', priests were initialised as 'C', the women from the
focus group are initialised as '0' and the informant from the umbrella organization is initialised as 'E'.
This means, as we shall see in the study that informants from the academic community are presented as
A: I, meaning informant number 1, and so on. The same applies to the other group of informants.
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public arena. These are merely a few examples. Referral to interview guides in the
appendix will indicate the full range of the discussions.
6.2 Broad themes
6.2.1 Perceptions of civil society in Malawi
In the in-depth interviews with 13 key informants: 4 from Women and Law, 2 from
Women's Voice, 6 from the faith community and 1 from CONGOMA, all were asked
how they understood and conceptualised the meaning contained within the term 'civil
society'. From my general observation, all respondents revealed similar perceptions
of the term. However, 1 informant from the faith community could not answer the
question.
For instance, 3 Roman Catholic priests and 1 woman from the focus group generally
perceived civil society as comprising all citizens in the country. 7 out of the 13
informants went into greater detail in explaining that civil society referred to
organized bodies that are non-governmentaf and non-profit making3 that take part in
the affairs of government4 but in most cases might not directly involve themselves in
the running of government.5
In addition, 3 out of the 7 key informants specifically stated that the objectives of civil
society are towards the development of the country in areas such as providing
economic and legal support,6 trying to advance people's rights and addressing their
concerns7 or merely working towards serving the people. 8 Moreover, 3 out of the 13
interviews went on to add that civil society comprises religious organizations and as
such is not only limited to NGOs and the secular world.9
2 Interview conducted with informants B: I Wednesday, 10th July 2002; 8: 3 Tuesday, 23'd July 2002;
B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002; and E: I Saturday, 20th July 2002.
3 Interview conducted with informant E: 1 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
4 Interview conducted with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
5 Interview conducted with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
6 Interview conducted with informant B: 3 Tuesday, 23'd July 2002.
7 Interview conducted with informant 8: 4 Tuesday, 23'd July 2002.
8 Interview conducted with informant B: 1 Wednesday, 10th July 2002.
9 Interviews ;;vith informants C: 2 Monday, 22nd July 2002; 8: I Wednesday, 10th July 2002; and 8: 4
Tuesday,23' July 2002.
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However, out of the 13 key infonnants, the most conCIse understanding of civil
society came from infonnant B: 1. She referred to civil society as:
That branch of society that is not part of government but also not
exclusive to NGOs. They can comprise of organizations like the
church and sometimes commercial centres depending on what work
they do. Thus, civil society is an extension that goes beyond just
NGOs. It refers to organizations that are non-governmental and who
are working towards serving the people. ID
Some particularly pertinent findings in the area of perceptions of civil society that
emerged from infonnants in this study should be clearly stated:
• Almost all infonnants are fully cognisant of the concept and its conventionally
accepted meanings. (There is one exception, as stated above).
• No infonnants seem inclined to debate the concept's usefulness in a Malawian
context.
• All infonnants are active in some meaningful way with 'ordinary Malawians'
whether in ministering to their spiritual needs, catering for their material
needs, or simply providing and articulating infonnation about constitutional-
legal rights under the new dispensation. They therefore demonstrate a 'hands-
on', common sense perception of what civil society is and does. Arguably,
this provides a useful counterpoint to more theoretical and complex
discussions in the literature.
• At least 1 infonnant demonstrates great insight into the composition of civil
society in Malawi. He said:
The nation makes up civil society in Malawi because nobody can
choose not to be politically active because all people, in one way
or another, are involved in politics with or without their direct
consent. I I
6.2.2 Perceptions of political change and leadership in Malawi
\0 Interview with informant 8: 1 Wednesday, 10th July 2002.
\1 Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
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Perceptions of the current nature of leadership changes in Malawi tend to vary.
However, from the interviews conducted, it seems that on the surface, perceptions are
that the identity and direction of political leadership in Malawi today has changed
since the Banda era. 12 out of the 24 key informants (4 from the women's
organization and 8 from the academic community) agree that, indeed, the identity and
direction of leadership at least to some extent has changed. Almost all of those in
agreement justified their opinion on the basis that the political environment has
changed. Responses such as: people are allowed to vote, NGOs are allowed to exist,
the political landscape allows for pluralism and freedom of speech and expression
indicate to the researcher that informants believe that a change in political leadership
has made some difference. As one informant put it:
Personally I would like to believe that the direction of leadership has
changed since the Banda era. Maybe in the sense that now leadership
is quite accommodating. 12
However, as indicated above, a portion of the informants incline to the view that so
far, change is superficial. 10 out of the 24 of the informants interviewed expressed
some reservations. For example, in the interviews conducted with the 4 informants
from Women and Law, 2 of them eloquently expressed their sentiments about the
current status of political leadership. 1 informant stated "those who speak, speak at
their own peril".13 And although constitutionally, people have been granted freedom
of speech and expression, "when people start commenting on what government is
doing, government views that as political interference"14 It is also indicated that input
of civil society activities is not appreciated, especially if it is not in line with the
governments ideas and policies. For instance, I informant from the focus group
stated:
They are (government) resisting when it come to issues from civil
society. But when Bills are in their interest, automatically they act
to pass the Bill. So, in short, we find that when civil society is
trying to give their input, it is only heard and acted upon if it is
to government's advantage. IS
8 of the academics interviewed echoed these reservations about the new political
dispensation. Whilst they acknowledge that the political dispensation has changed in
12 Interview with informant B: 3 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
13 Interview with informant B: 1 Wednesday, 10th July 2002.
14 Interview with informant B: 4 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
15 Interview with informant D: 5 Friday, 26th July 2002.
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that the electorate now are allowed to participate In national and parliamentary
elections, their concern is more with the quality of change, if any. For instance,
speaking about their opinion of political discourse in Malawi, 3 out of the 8
informants expressed their disappointment with the current level of political discourse
both within and outside parliament. I informant stated, "Political discourse within
and between political parties is not as healthy and as frequent as it should be".16 The
reason given for this criticism is that there seems to be a tendency for the ruling party
to dominate political discussions; as a result, as another informant put it, "public
debates and discourse are not deep enough, and there seems to be no attempts made
for any serious consultative dialogue within the political parties themselves".17 As
such, I informant concluded, "debates are not substantive enough to influence
effective policies because of the lack of involvement of the ordinary Malawian" .18
Findings here provide some indication that politically conscIOUS and informed
members of Malawi's civic communities continue to be distrustful of political
leadership, although responses vary from quite hopeful of real improvements to an
emphatic opinion that breaking the silence continues to be perilous. Some important
political contributions are noted; on the other hand, 10 out of the 24 informants
indicate that change is more superficial than substantive. Additionally, 3 out of 8
informants fell that the quality of debate is low.
6.2.3 Perceptions of 'space' and 'voice' in Malawian society and politics
Issues organized under this broad theme are interrogated in interviews with members
of women's groups and of the academic community. Looking first at women's
organizations, the question concerns the perceived existence or otherwise of a culture
of political participation. Of the 4 women interviewed individually, 3 responses are
negative and I is positive. Examples of the negative responses are:
... the society we live in is volatile ... talking about politics can be scary
for most people ...most people are interested in politics but it's just that
there are so many other constraints. 19
16 Interview with informant A: 1 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
17 Interview with informant A: 5 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
18 Interview with informant A: 4 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
19 Interview with informant B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
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She indicates that restraints on expressivity are still very much in place. When asked
if she thinks that the current regime is shifting back towards a Banda-like intolerance
of criticism, she responds by saying that it all depends on what issues civil society is
dealing with. For instance, "if you are dealing with socio-economic rights and
cultural rights .. .I don't think government finds them threatening...but if you are
going to deal with political rights, then the government finds them very threatening. 2D
Another informant remarks that "the more things change, the more things remain the
same,,21 and adds, "Government is always suspicious about your noble intentions".22
Thus, in regards to political participation, she feels that "voices penetrate the public
sphere by chance ...but not without penalties".23 She suggested that to a certain
extent, there is a gag on the voices of the people in Malawi, and that "these days it has
become like those who speak, speak at their own peril".24
A third informant echoes the first. She also feels that "what government views as
political interference is not appreciated".25 Like the first informant, she feels that
government's tolerance and responsiveness to civil society depends on the focus area
of a particular organization. Another informant from the woman's organization
suggests, "Government does not want to hear people's voices".26 What civil society
and the people on the ground are therefore suggesting is that criticism is not very
welcome in Malawi, especially when the voices of ordinary Malawians, or from civil
society, seek to question government on controversial policies. I informant from the
women's organization thus stated: "so in as much as we are free, the open-culture that
may be found in some Western countries does not exist here". 27
However, I informant had a positive response and felt that to a large extent, political
participation from civil society is accepted in terms of "initiating the processes of
law".28 She finds that government ministries respond well to advice on legislation
20 Ibid.




25 Interview with informant 8: 4 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
26 Interview with informant 8: 3 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
27 Interview with informant 8: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
28 Interview with informant 8: 3 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
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and policy; the response is appreciative and indicates that government is supportive of
civil society's initiatives
In a focus group interview, I informant argues that there is a CIVIC culture of
participation which currently is being blocked by government. She feels that
government resists in regards to issues raised by civil society. However, "when bills
are in their interest, automatically, they act to pass the bill".29 A second informant
argues that politicians "regard civil society as being in opposition,,30 and a third
argues that society as a whole in Malawi suffers from "a lack of communication
because they don't really know the issues".3l (The fourth and fifth informants
expressed non-verbal agreement with verbalized perceptions).
Generally, of the 8 women interviewed, only one has a particularly good opinion of
government's tolerance and willingness to hear and learn from civic voices. All
others feel that government is threatened by what it views as political activity, which
it sees as a space exclusive to itself. 1 informant feels that ignorance of political
issues keeps perhaps a majority of voices silent.32
Looking next at the academic community, the theme was interrogated by a question
relating to political and civic space in Malawi. Are they perceived as mutually
exclusive or interdependent? Of the 8 academics interviewed, only I declined to
respond (feeling that the question was too complicated); I response was lost as the
tape recorder ran out. Of the 6 recorded responses, 3 are lengthy, indicating interest
in the issue. Additionally, informants offer some nuanced analyses. For instance, 1
informant expresses the view that the two spaces feed into one another but not in a
balanced way that can be mathematically calculated. Having made his point, he
offers an opinion that political space is dominant and will continue to be. The
analogy he gives is of. ..
.. .politicalleaders at different levels assuming the role of gatekeepers.
Sometimes they open it slightly - the voices sometimes are heard
depending on whether they are complementing the views or policies
or needs of the pOliticians ... whereas certain amounts of voices are
29 Interview with informant D: 5 Friday, 26th July 2002.
30 Interview with informant D: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
31 Interview with informant D: 1 Friday, 26 th July 2002.
32 Interview with informant B: 1 Wednesday, 10th July 2002.
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shut out because they are - that is their perception - going to
destabilize the situation.33
Another informant used a different analogy:
The dancing space for politicians is different from the dancing
space for civil society... the spaces are mutually exclusive but not
independent. Civil society defends and promotes human rights ...
government is there to defend the order or status quo ...Now, you
can keep things going at the expense of others. Civil society is thus
present to look after the interests of the minority or marginalized,
the discriminated, the people left out in the trend of development.
Civil society is present to protect, not just rights but also to provide
checks and balances to avoid excesses of power.34
What he seems to suggest is that there is a working relationship between the two
separate spaces in which similarities and differences are relayed according to the
different sites and interests they defend. In as much as they may occupy different
spaces, they do listen to each other and try to reach a consensus on issues affecting the
wider community. To that end, they may be deemed as independent from one
another, yet also connected.
A third academic echoes the first. He perceives that there is difficulty in trying to
measure which space feeds into the other. To say that "some kind of correlative
relationship exists where expansion or shrinkage in one reflects an expansion or
shrinkage in another is too quantitative to compute".35 As such, he feels that the
spaces are both mutually exclusive and inclusive. He illustrates his opinion by
saying:
One might belong to a political party but at the same time occupy a
position in civil society...which is kind of distracting and difficult to
quantitatively say that this is the line of progression or digression of
expansion and shrinkage of space in the two arenas ... an individuals
voice might be heard in the two spaces ...For instance, you could have
your voice being heard in civic space because your particular interests
or urgent needs need to be taken care of in that space, whilst at the same
time your other interests may be taken care of in the political space and
you have another voice being heard.36
33 Interview with informant A: 5 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
34 Interview with informant A: 7 Tuesday, 2nd July 2002.
35 Interview with informant A: 2 Friday, 5th July 2002.
36 Ibid.
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In light of the variety of opinions expressed regarding 'voice' and 'space', generally,
of the 3 responses highlighted above, it is difficult to reach a clear or definite
conclusion. The idea of 'space' contains nuances and there are difficulties in
establishing finite distinctions between one space and another. However, it seems to
be suggested by most informants that political space tends to be dominated by the
political hierarchy. 1 informant provided an example that illustrates the extent of
dominance.
During the open-term debate, academics and students were subjected to
harassment from the police. The idea was to prevent students from
voicing their anti-third term views. So essentially and theoretically
political space has opened up, but in reality it is getting narrower and
narrower and I think we might end up with the kind of situation we had
under Dr Banda. 37
Another informant echoes these sentiments concerning the ruling party's behaviour,
especially in terms of its dominance over political space in Malawi. He argues that
the ruling party is gradually assuming the position of the one-party state. 38
6.3 Academic community: specific themes
6.3.1 The neo-colonial paradigm in Malawi
Given the dissertation's conceptual framework, a function of qualitative data in
relation to the academic community is to collect and record academic's perceptions of
Ca) the meaning of 'neo-colonialism', and Cb) Malawi's place within that paradigm. 7
out of the 8 informants perceive Banda's Malawi as neo-colonial. However, 1
informant argues that it is not accurate to apply a blanket definition of 'neo-colonial'
to Banda's regime. He argues that in post-independence Africa, " ...no leader in my
view, really was able to bring about a totally new perspective to not only politics, but
also development. Apart from attempts by people like Nkrumah, it didn't last".39
However, he cites as an area of continuity between colonial and post-colonial Malawi,
"the capitalist modes of production",4o and the issue of dependency. On the other
37 Interview with informant A: 6 Friday, 6th July 2002.
38 Interview with informant A: 5 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
39 Interview with informant A: 5 Tuesday, 23 rd July 2002.
40 Ibid.
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hand, he argues that Malawi went from being a non-participatory colonial polity to -
under Banda - a polity in which mass-based organizations 'reached out to the people'
"not only politically in terms of supporting the newly born nation, but also
economically with regards to various projects, which were introduced, for instance,
ADMARC".41 He also argues "there was considerable development in the
agricultural sphere,,42 and that profits were reinvested "within the confines of the
country".43
Moving on to the perceptions of the other 7 informants. One firmly stated that: "Dr
Banda's regime was neo-colonial. We simply replaced Governor General Glyn Jones
with our own Dr Banda".44 He cites the elitist education system, in particular the
Kamuzu Academy, and quoted Banda as saying "no black man will ever teach at that
institution".45 He also cites the regime's interference in and censorship of the
university syllabus, and the arrest and detention of academics because "they were
teaching ideologies against his own... ,,46 On the academic front, he argues that Banda,
"in his attitude and policies, he simply perpetuated what had been started under the
colonial government".47
A second informant argues that what characterized the Banda regime, as neo-colonial
was the centralization of state power and political repression which did not allow
local people "to participate in the governance of public affairs, and they were not
given full political and civil rights".48 Another informant echoes this point and states
that the Banda regime was "indeed an extension of colonialism... one of the major
issues in Malawi was that people were not free or allowed to participate meaningfully
in almost every area and Banda had total control over the economy, politics and
almost everything in society".49 A fourth informant adds that the style of Banda's








48 Interview with informant A: 2 Friday, 5th July 2002.
49 Interview with informant A: 4 Tuesday, 2nd July 2002.
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on policies. "He referred to his government as Kamuzuism, which simply meant his
own style of government - Banda's way of doing things - dictatorship".5o
These are a few examples of the ideas expressed by the 8 academics interviewed.
Generally, 7 out of the 8 informants perceive Banda's Malawi as neo-colonial. I
informant feels that a blanket definition might be too broad a conclusion to draw.
However, for 7 out of the 8 informants, the concept 'neo-colonial' has strong
resonance when looking at the Banda regime.
6.3.2 Under-representation of Malawi in research publications
This question tended to generate responses which enlarged on the theme of neo-
colonialism. I sought explanations as to why Malawi is markedly underrepresented in
research publications in the areas of African politics, societies and country-specific
studies. All 8 informants argue that one factor applies, namely, that the Banda
regime's attitude to intellectual production made publication difficult, even perilous.
Interestingly, the informant who does not agree with a depiction of Malawi as fully
neo-colonial, says that "academics had to be extremely careful about what they wrote
because (oj) the likelihood of being detained by authorities ... ,,51. In other words,
although he does not entirely agree with defining Banda's Malawi as neo-colonial, he
still highlights one of the major features of neo-colonial rule, that is, the regime's
intolerance of criticism. As one academic states, "it was therefore not easy for
Malawians to speak out honestly about the political realities and to comment critically
on what was going on in the country".52
A second informant points out that "political science as a discipline was banned at the
University of Malawi ... ,,53. Courses such as political philosophy and African history
were not allowed to be taught, and this "in itself constrained research activities in the
areas of politics and critical thinking in Malawi".54 A third informant further echoes
this point. ... "Under the single party regime, some political ideas, political
50 Interview with informant A: 3 Thursday, 4th July 2002.
51 Interview with informant A: 5 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
52 Interview with informant A: 3 Thursday, 4 th July 2002.
53 Interview with informant A: 2 Friday, 5th July 2002.
54 Ibid.
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philosophies were not allowed. They were taught under history. There was no
political science ... That is why in the past, you did not have writers specifically
focusing on areas on which political scientists would write".55
A fourth informant further explains that before one could do any research related to
politics in Malawi, one had to get clearance through the National Research Council
and the police. As such, getting clearance was a tedious and lengthy process that
frustrated academics and this resulted in "many of them giving up the field ofresearch
and simply concentrated their efforts on reciting and analysing what other people had
written". 56
Although Malawi since has undergone a transition from one-party politics to multi-
party politics what several informants suggest is that the current dispensation "has still
not entirely opened up society as people still have that culture of fear".57 One
informant poignantly states, "Many of us are still afraid of the potential negative
consequences of talking (and writing) about the ills of Malawian society".58 The fear
stems from possible misinterpretation and thus, as the informant puts it: "the easiest
way to avoid misinterpretation is not to do any research on Malawian issues
especially on issues that could be regarded as controversial".59
However, this is not to say that under the current dispensation no efforts have been
made by the academics in terms of research and publications. Since 1994, one
informant mentioned that "a local publication called Kachere Series was established
and it has published a number of books. One entitled Democratisation: A Stocktaking
and yet another book was published on The Second Elections in Malawi".60
However, in as much as academics and researchers are taking the initiative to publish
articles and books, reservations are still expressed. For example, the informant states,
"the remnants of the past are not completely gone. Sometimes there is still fear of
55 Interview with informant A: 1 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
56 Interview with informant A: 6 Friday, 5th July 2002.
57 Interview with informant A: 2 Friday, 5th July 2002.
58 Interview with informant A: 4 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
59 Ibid.
60 Interview with informant A: I Saturday, 20th July 2002.
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how open can we be, how critical can we be? We cannot always be as critical or as
. h" 61open as we WIS .
Findings here suggest that:
• The under-representation of Malawi in the literature cannot be separated from
issues of neo-colonialism, specifically (a) the Banda regime's attitude to
intellectual production which meant that self-censorship had to be practiced;
Cb) a climate of fear and a 'culture of silence' ; (c) banning of disciplines which
encourage critical thinking; (d) lengthy and difficult bureaucratic requirements
and delays.
• Even after the transition from neo-colonialism, academics are still uneasy and
to some extent continue to practice self-censorship.
• However, there is some opening up and improvement III the field of
publication: a hopeful sign for the future, perhaps.
6.3.3 Issues of 'high politics' and 'Iow politics'
Informants were asked what type of democracy (procedural or 'high politics');
(substantive or 'low politics') they would prioritise in today's Malawi, and why? Of
the 8 informants, 6 gave priority to substantive democracy, I informant provide an
equivocal response and I prioritised procedural democracy. This informant argues in
terms of two transitions, citing a text on African democracy.
. . .in the first transition, you are establishing the formal institutions,
and the second transition is where democracy then becomes really
operational through public participation. We are in that stage where
they are setting up those formal institutions and we have not yet
started grappling with substantive democracy 62.
This informant suggests that issues such as "how do we balance liberty and
equality?,,63 are not yet being addressed in Malawi. Only the "very basic structures,,64
are in place, and in any case it is "not an even process".65 Instead, it is "two steps







forward or backward".66 In general, this response suggests that even procedural
democracy is by no means firmly established in Malawi. It is still very fragile and
perhaps in this sense should be prioritised (although it should be noted that this
informant did not make a definite statement to that effect).
The informant whose response is equivocal sees both processes taking place, at least
to a certain extent. He argues that "the situation in Malawi leans towards procedural
elements ...but you cannot compartmentalize Malawi and say this is the only process
in Malawi".67
Of the 6 informants who gave priority to substantive democracy, reasons given are:
the very high level of unemployment and the non-existent status of economic justice
means that "these are issues government should be tackling,,68 rather than being
"more concerned with the next elections".69 Since procedural democracy means "the
supremacy of the majority principle,,7o this has been implemented; what has not - and
should be- is "people's democracy,,71 at the heart of which is "implementation of
people's rights".72 A second informant distinguishes between his personal preference
(substantive) as opposed to what actually exists in Malawi (procedural). He believes
that the reason why procedural democracy is being prioritised by government at the
moment is because "the substantive one is more challenging to the government
bearing in mind the challenges of distribution".73 A third informant feels that
substantive democracy should be given priority because "the ordinary and the
majority of Malawians do not understand issues of economic justice ...which I think
can result in true democracy".74 A fourth informant echoes this preference by stating
that Malawi should concentrate on substantive democracy because if we concentrate
on social and economic justice, "we are going to do away with problems of tribalism,
partisan politics and discrimination".75
66 Ibid.
67 Interview with informant A: 8 Friday, 5th July 2002.
68 Interview with informant A: 6 Friday, 5th July 2002.
69 Ibid.
70 Interview with informant A: 2 Friday, 5th July 2002.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Interview with informant A: 3 Thursday, 4 th July 2002.
74 Interview with informant A: 4 Tuesday, 2nd July 2002.
75 Interview with informant A: 7 Tuesday, 2nd July 2002.
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The findings suggest that while, in actuality, procedural democracy currently is
prioritised, a lot more attention should be paid to issues of social and economic justice
- in effect, to 'voices from below'.
6.3.4 Issue of whether or not Malawi needs a Truth Commission
This question was asked in an attempt to finesse opmlOns about the legacy of
oppression and human rights abuse, and informants' feelings on the issue. In general,
different opinions were expressed. 7 out of the 8 informants interviewed, 2 were
firmly in support of a Truth Commission, 3 said they did not think it would help, and
2 said maybe a Truth Commission might be necessary depending on the objectives it
sought to achieve.
Of the 2 informants who firmly believe that a Truth Commission is necessary in the
process of transition, 1 states that it would be a way "for clearing all the problems that
we have of suspicion and fear".76 The other informant feels that it would be a useful
tool for not "encouraging a culture of impunity".77 In his view, a Truth Commission
would be useful "if it led to the persecution of those individual that carried out
atrocities under the one-party regime".78
3 informants believe that it IS not necessary for Malawi to institute a Truth
Commission. 1 informant states that he views a Truth Commission in terms of
"recriminational strategies,,79 and "the best thing for Malawians is to begin to forgive,
but not forget".8o A second informant is of the view that "a Truth Commission may
make matters worse ...uncovering past wounds and leaving them open,,81 may create
"perhaps a more psychologically painful situation".82 This last point is picked up by
another informant who also feels that "the weakness in a Truth Commission is that it
76 Interview with informant A: I Saturday 20th July 2002.
77 Interview with informant A: 6 Friday, 5th July 2002.
78 Ibid.
79 Interview with informant A: 7 Tuesday, 2nd July 2002.
80 Ibid.
8\ Interview with informant A: 3 Thursday, 4 th July 2002.
82 Ibid.
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tends to open up old wounds, old bitterness, old pain which might have inevitable
spillover effects ... ,,83
However, some informants do express the VIew that there is room for a Truth
Commission especially if "it seeks reconciliation, forgiveness and coming to grips
with a clear understanding of your history no matter how dazzling the past is".84 It
would be useful "in connection with maybe, the murder of the cabinet ministers ... ,,85
2 informants feel that it is not likely to be implemented by the ruling party because
"many of the people who are now in government were in government during Banda's
regime and they are the ones who are not really for having a Truth Commission".86 1
informant suggests that fear is a factor hindering the process of implementing a Truth
Commission. " ... They all have skeletons in their cupboards, they are very scared of a
Truth Commission".87
Findings in this area suggest that issues are interrogated against a background of neo-
colonialism in its oppressive and repressive aspects. No informants respond as if
there are no reasons to have a Truth Commission. Where they differ is on how useful
or otherwise it might be. An interesting point that emerges relates to 'recycling of
elites'. A suggestion is made, that for a Truth Commission to work, Malawi "would
have to have totally new political leaders without links to the past to be there to take
that step".88
6.4 Women's Organizations: specific themes
6.4.1 Progress towards gender empowerment and equality (legal-constitutional)
83 Interview with informant A: 2 Friday, 5th July 2002.
84 Ibid.
85 Interview with informant A: 3 Thursday, 4th July 2002.
86 Interview with informant A: 4 Tuesday, 2nd July 2002.
87 Interview with informant A: 1 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
88 Interview with informant A: 5 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
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Women informants were drawn from two women's organizations, Women and Law
and Women's Voice. Although these women's organizations are separate entities,
they do however have similar objectives and programmes. In regards to the legal
framework in Malawi, all 9 informants agree on an issue which is best explicated by 4
of the informants. "The constitution of Malawi is progressive in that "most of the
provisions are similar to the ones contained in the South African and Namibian
constitution".89 Additionally, "it has a chapter on human rights, and within that
chapter, it has a specific section that talks about women's rights".9o More specific to
women are sections 13, "which invite the state to actively uphold the principles of
gender equality in the implementation of its projects".91 Section 20, specifically
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex "regardless of whatever colour, race and
religion".92 Section 24 specifically highlights the rights of women and "prohibits
discrimination whether in terms of children, women and issues of property".93 As
such, most informants feel that in terms of the provisions provided for in the
constitution, the women's organizations have made great progress in instituting and
accessing legal mechanisms that enable gender equality in Malawi. However, 1
informant did feel that "discrimination is still in practice".94
6.4.2 Opinions of progress towards gender empowerment on the ground
In regards to their specific lines of work, the informants were asked what
demonstrable progress has been made towards achieving gender equality and the
empowerment of women? 1 informant states, "We have helped improve the services
of justice in terms of what justice women get".95 This is achieved through research
efforts which have discovered that "most women have no structures or access to
structures that deliver justice".96 Another informant indicates that Women and Law
took it upon themselves "to enact a Domestic Violence Act in Malawi after
89 Interview with informant B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
90 Interview with informant B: 4 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
91 Interview with informant B: 1 Wednesday, 10th July 2002.
92 Interview with informant B: 3 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
93 Ibid.
94 Interview with informant B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
95 Interview with informant B: 3 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
96 Ibid.
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recognizing that the government has an obligation to put into place legislation that
would protect women against domestic violence".97 A third informant states that
Women and Law together with the Ministry of Gender are involved in trying to repeal
some of the existing laws, for example, the Wills and Inheritance Act. However, she
also mentions that
...To date all the data was left at the Ministry of Gender to compile and
and enter it into the computer package ...we are still waiting for it. ..
of course some sections of the Wills and Inheritance Act have been
amended... for example, Section 84(a) providin~ for the criminalization
of property grabbing...but it was not adequate.9
A fourth informant firmly believes that "the fact that more women are coming
out. .. and are no longer shy to come and deal with cases of domestic violence,,99 is an
indicator that progress towards a measure of gender equality is being made. Another
suggests, "to enhance balanced justice, we've made sure that we train women... from
h . . h 'b d . " 100t ese trammgs ...we ave contn ute to empowenng women.
From the focus group interview, 1 informant feels that they "have managed to pull
women from a marginalized, disempowered status"IOI... by "affirmative
action" 102 ... focusing on the empowerment of women only. A second informant
suggests that "previously, it was tradition that a woman could not stand in front of a
man, now after civic education, you find that women can stand and talk to the chiefs
and the public" .103 A third informant feels that through the training sessions Women
and Voice organized in 1999 for women that were trying to stand in the presidential
and parliamentary elections, "out of the number of women we trained... at least out of
that 80, 17 were elected members of parliament where previously we only had 9
women MPs". 104 This indicates to her that some progress is being made.
Findings here suggest that constitutional provISIOn for gender equality and
empowerment are generally progressive, although there is room for improvement.
However, when it comes to implementation on the ground of progressive statutes, it
97 Interview with informant B: 4 Friday, 26th July 2002.
98 Interview with informant B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
99 Interview with informant B: I Wednesday, 10th July 2002.
100 Interview with informant B: 3 Tuesday, 23 rd July 2002.
101 Interview with informant D: 5 Friday, 26th July 2002.
102 Ibid.
103 Interview with informant D: 3 Friday, 26th July 2002.
104 Interview with informant D: 1 Friday, 26th July 2002.
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would seem that progress is slow, partial and quite arduous. Even so, the informants
generally seem to focus on their positive achievements and thus reinforce their sense
of commitment.
6.4.3 Opinions about government's attitude to gender empowerment
Aside from legislative and policy-oriented activities undertaken by both
organizations, informants were asked whether they feel that women's vOices In
Malawi are heard in the public arena, that is, governance. 4 of the informants from
Women and Law all agree that government has been supportive of their initiatives at
empowering women. 105 2 out of the 4 informants specifically mentioned the support
they receive from the Ministry of Gender. However, 1 informant feels that tensions
"always exist between NGOs and government.. .but our strategy is to sieve out the
tensions and continue with our work because this is not about government and us, it is
about the women whom we are trying to empower". 106 Another informant from the
focus group echoes these sentiment when she says, "They (government) forget that we
are trying to help them, that we are trying to do things that they can't do ... ,,107
Generally, most of informants believe that government is supportive of the initiatives
taken by women's organizations. Thus, in terms of government's attitude towards
empowering women and promoting women's rights, government places no constraints
on the activities of civil society. This is possibly because such advocacy work is
viewed as non-threatening. (For quotation, see p. 88, above).
6.4.4 Working with rural women
Informants from both organizations were asked how much work is done in rural areas,
what aspects are given priority, and how active are rural women in their own
empowerment? Informants from the focus group state that their work takes them
more to the rural areas, because "52% of the nation's women are in the villages,,108
and especially because "there are so many similar women's organizations that
105 Interview~ with infonnants B: I Wednesday, 10th July 2002; B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002; B: 3
Tuesday, 23' July 2002; and B: 4 Tuesday, 23'd July 2002.
106 Interview with infonnant B: I Wednesday, loth July 2002.
107 Interview with infonnant 0: IFriday, 26th July 2002.
108 Interview with infonnant 0: I Friday, 26 th July 2002.
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disseminate the same sort of informantion... so we rather move into the rural areas
because we will be duplicating issues".109 However, 1 informant states that they
currently have a project running in the peri-urban township of Ndirande, this is in an
attempt to balance their work and also because they "discovered that they (women) do
not know their rights".110 In addition, 1 of the 4 informants from Women and Law
says that their work takes place more in rural areas because "when we conduct
research and provide legal-rights education, we go out to the rural masses". III
However, 3 out of the 4 feel that their work is equally divided between urban and
rural areas. They point out that the kind of work they do differs depending on the
geographical location. For instance, 2 informants state that in the rural areas "we
work with the grassroots people, especially the women...we educate them about their
rights as well as educating men on women's rights and their duties and
responsibilities viz a viz each other". 112 In urban areas, I informant states that their
work has more to do with "advocacy and lobbying, this means we have to target
groups like government bodies, government departments, or other civil society
groupS".ll3 Informants were also asked for their opinions of how active rural women
are in their own empowerment.
All 4 of the informants feel that rural women do have the capacity to organize and
mobilize themselves. 114 I informant, however, stipulates that rural women "would
still need somebody who is trained to come in and show them what to do, whether it is
in terms of will writing or inheritance issues".115 Another informant highlights the
fact that "the only difference is maybe that we are bringing in new concepts"116 ...
"bringing in additional knowledge maybe added value to what they already knoW".I17
This links up with another informant's idea of the role of urban women in providing
information... "in the area that they are in because leaders in urban areas are exposed
to many things ... so the rural women would need the leadership and guidance from
109 Interview with informant D: 5 Friday, 26th July 2002.
110 Interview with informant D: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
I11 Interview with informant B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
112 Interview with informants B: 1Wednesday, 10th July 2002 and B: 4 Tuesday, 23rd July 2002.
113 Interview with informants B: 3 Tuesday, 23 rd July 2002 and B: 4 Tuesday, 23 rd July 2002.
114 Interview~ with informants B: IWednesday, loth July 2002; B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002; B: 3
Tuesday,23
r
July 2002; and B: 4 Tuesday, 23 rd July 2002
115 Interview with informant B: 3 Tuesday, 23 rd July 2002.
116 Interview with informant B: 2 Friday, 26th July 2002.
117 Ibid.
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women III the urban areas ... ,,118 Finally, a fourth informant argues that urban
leadership is necessary because rural people "need resources ... in terms of tangible
things ... ,,119 However, she is the only informant who highlights that although women
in urban areas are educated "we still need to create a critical mass of educated women
who are looking at issues of rights and issues of leadership" 120 ... so although urban
women might be educated, "how do they benefit from that education?,,121 ...Urban
women need to use their education "to become more sensitive to the needs of other
women... and to get organized for the sake of empowering our own sisters out there in
h '11 ,,122t e VI ages ...
Findings suggest that although there is a difference between the amount of education
and exposure women receive, especially in as much as urban women tend to be better
educated, this does not necessarily suggest that rural women are unable to learn and
acquire new knowledge that will aid in empowering themselves. The role of urban-
based women's organizations generally is perceived as that of disseminating
information and acting as facilitators. 1 informant highlights that even in urban areas,
there is still much to be done, and adds that " ... our staff membership is small because
you are looking at an organization that is in the interests of women and in Malawi, if
we are going to effect change, we need more staff to go into all the rural areas of
Malawi". 123
6.4.5 Women in positions of power
Arguably, the status of women in any given society is a measure of that society's
openness, or otherwise. Therefore, the question interrogated informant's opinions. 3
out of the 4 informants interviewed individually believe that in today's Malawi there
are more women in positions of power. 2 informants state that although they do not
know the exact figures, "maybe there are more women in positions of power and
more women today are politically proactive ...whereas in Banda's era, he just
1\8 Interview with informant B: 4 Tuesday, 23'd July 2002.






nominated women". 124 Another informant gives examples: "today there are more
women in parliament and we have more women and leaders who head embassies ... so
.. d ,,125 HI can say that the government IS trymg to accommo ate women . owever, a
fourth informant is of the opinion that not many women are in positions of power.
"You just have to look at the Cabinet. The Cabinet has a few Deputy Ministers who
are women. There is no quota system, unfortunately, because if there were then we'd
maybe have more women in power". 126
In the focus group interview, 1 informant says, "We really can't be clear on this. But
in the four districts we are working in, we have tried out best to elevate the status of
women... " 127 Another informant states that "in our district offices, we see women
coming to complain about violations of their rights where they previously did not.
This signals to us that to some extent the status of women, especially in rural areas is
. ." 128Improvmg .
Generally, findings suggest that there has been some improvement in the political
status of women, although opinions differ about how much or how significant it is.
6.5 The role ofthe religious community: speCific themes
6.5.1 The role and effectiveness of the Justice and Peace Workshops
Under this specific theme I asked the informants whether they felt that role of the
Justice and Peace Workshops was effective in its tasks of peace building,
reconciliation and educating people on civil rights and responsibilities. All 6
informants interviewed firmly believe that the Justice and Peace workshops are
meeting the challenges of promoting social justice through increasing awareness of
fundamental principles such as human and civic rights. 1 informant states, " ... the
workshops are working out very well and they are quite effective in that people over
the past year, past two years, seem to understand their rights now more than
124 Interview with informant B: 2 Friday, 26 th July 2002.
125 Interview with informant B: 3 Tuesday, 23 rd July 2002.
126 Interview with informant B: 1 Wednesday, 10th July 2002.
127 Interview with informant D: 5 Friday, 26th July 2002.
128 Interview with informant D: 3 Friday, 26th July 2002.
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before". 129 However, 3 informants added a note of caution in regards to CIVIC
education. 1 informant says, " ... I am yet to see what it will be like in the 2004
election... ,,130 Another informant states, "we are hoping that in the next two or three
years, people should be able to vote properly without being enticed to vote for
somebody whom they don't actually know".l3l A third informant lists some
problems.
... there was a bit of hostility from government. Secondly, the objectives
of the workshops were not clear to some participants. Thirdly, there were
false expectations ...people would come to the workshop in the hope of
receiving some kind of material reward. Fourthly, ... there were weaknesses
from the organizers, ... there were no follow-ups or appraisals conducted
on the workshops. Finally, ... there is a need for collaborative pastoral
strategy... ~riests, the clergy, and even the laypersons need to work
together. 13
General findings suggest that although all 6 informants are very committed to the role
of the Justice and Peace workshops, most informants are waiting to see what the
turnout and voter behaviour is like in the 2004 elections before making a final
judgement on the effectiveness of the workshops.
6.5.2 The Public Affairs Committee (PAC)
Here the researcher sought to obtain opinions of informants about how representative
the PAC's agendas and concerns are of the concerns of ordinary Malawians. 3 out of
4 informants here assert that the PAC's agenda represents the concerns of ordinary
Malawians. 1 informant links his opinion to the fact that the PAC is very well
connected to the Peace and Justice Commission" ... in which case I would say that
their agendas are really the ones reflected in the Peace and Justice Commission in our
parish".133 Another informant believes that the PAC is an important and effective
body because "it provides resources ... and people depend on the PAC for resources
and guidelines .. .It co-ordinates activities that are taking place among and within
institutions like the Churches, NGOs and government". 134 In his opinion, this
signifies that "the agenda of the PAC is addressed not least to the high class people,
129 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
130 Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
131 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
132 Interview with informant C: 2 Monday 220d July 2002.
133 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
134 Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
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but to the grassroots like those in the villages, to empower them and let them know
about their rights". 135 A third informant feels that they do address the concerns of
ordinary Malawians because, "in the sense that they are giving civic education on
democracy, and also trying to create a dialogue and spirit of tolerance between
political parties". 136 He adds, "I also would give credit on the PAC's efforts in trying
to foster a spirit of ecumenism... whereby various religious organizations come
together to give ideas, and to address common problems".
However, 1 informant doubts that the PAC addresses the concerns of the ordinary
Malawians. His reasons are:
... the body was formed because of political reasons .. .it was basically
to fight against the political system... after that fight, there was more
or less a kind of silence ... They would speak, but they would speak
only when there was some kind of political disagreement.. .I feel that
this has happened because that body was born from above. It was a
top-down approach, which is contrary to when a body is organized
from the bottom. If that body was representing the people, it would have
been formed from the grassroots because then there would be an avenue
where people would channel their views and speak on behalf of
themselves. 137
Findings are that all 6 informants are strongly committed to the work of the PAC in
principle, but that while one feels that the PAC's connection to the Peace and Justice
Commission makes it more effective in the parishes, another believes that the
connection indicates a top-down approach, and to that extent it is not in touch with
grassroots needs and priorities.
6.5.3 Church priorities
Here, the question raised related to whether the informants felt that the Church should
primarily concern itself with traditional religious tasks, or should give equal weight to
addressing social and economic injustices and inequalities in Malawi. All 6
informants seem convinced that the Church should give equal weight to addressing
social and economic injustices and inequalities. 1 informant expresses the view that:
.. .it is wrong to conceptualise religion and social and political realms as
separate ... the two should not be separated. Once you start separating the
135 Ibid.
136 Interview with informant C: 2 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
137 Interview with informant C: I Monday, 22nd July 2002.
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two, then you are not doing God's work because even in the gospel there
are social and political implications. 138
A second informant believes that "Only through addressing both the spiritual and
material concerns of the people ... can the Church foster development in both spiritual
and material well-being".139 A third informant states, "The Church should concern
itself with both...without the social aspect coming into it. .. we cannot preach
effectively if there is injustice". 140 In terms of meeting the social and economic needs
of the people, 1 informant states that the Catholic Church has the body Catholic
Development Commission of Malawi (CADECOM). CADECOM "is there to deal
with social concerns of the people, like hunger. .. Secondly, to give workshops on how
people can take care of themselves ... there are also projects that maybe give out
fertilizer as an incentive to motivate people ... ,,141
Findings are that all 6 informants believe the Church should play an active role in
addressing issues of social and economic justice. As 1 informant puts it: " ... when the
missionaries came here ...They brought the bible, but they also had to bring education,
d .. d 1 " 142an expertIse m eve opment .
6.5.4 Positions of women
Here, questions targeted attitudes and perceptions regarding women in the Roman
Catholic Church. All informants indicate that women are underrepresented in the
various activities the Church undertakes. For example, 1 informant indicates that in
his parish council "the proportion is 1I3 rd to men".143 Another states that although he
does not know the exact figure, "I know good percentages are men". 144 Yet another
informant confirms that his parish council "is made up of men mostly, but we have
three women who are members of the parish council executive".145 A fourth
138 Interview with informant C: 1 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
139 Interview with informant C: 2 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
\40 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
\4\ Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
142 Interview with informant C: I Monday, 22nd July 2002.
143 Ibid.
\44 Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
\45 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
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infonnant states that, "As of now, there are very few women on the parish council. I
would say, the ratio is 1:5".146
However, 1 infonnant mentions, "something is now being encouraged, but as of now,
it is coming very, very slowly".147 Most infonnants indicate that women tend to shy
away from taking up leadership positions because "society in general is still male-
dominated". 148 According to 2 infonnants, "culture and tradition"149 tend to assign
women to playing "secondary roles in the Church".15o 1 infonnant suggests that
women "still feel inferior"151 and as a result "tend to be submissive".152 Another
infonnant suggests that education or a lack of it is perhaps a limiting factor. "In
Malawi there is a problem that not many women are educated".153 As such, "they
can't take part in such kinds of things like liturgy reading in the event of a priest not
being present". 154
Thus, according to the perceptions of infonnants, women continue to play a secondary
role in Church activities. As 1 infonnant put it, they have "a long way to go in tenns
of educating women to feel that they are part of the Church, and that they can also
take responsibility". 155 It is worth noting that all infonnants evidenced awareness of
and (in varying degrees) concern for the position of women in the Church.
6.5.5 Empowerment of post-Banda civil society
Here, targeted issues are the developmental role of the Church. Infonnation shows
that all 6 infonnants finnly believe that the Church and their parish council is actively
involved in empowering civil society. 1 infonnant states "The Church and the parish
council, together with the Justice and Peace workshops are providing the people with
146 Interview with informant C: 2 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
147 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
148 Interviews with informants C: 2 Monday, 22nd July 2002; C: 4 Saturday, 20 th July 2002; and C: I
Monday, 22nd July 2002.
149 Interviews with informants C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002 and C: 2 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
150 Ibid.
151 Interview with informant C: 1 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
152 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
153 Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
154 Ibid.
155 Interview with informant C: 1 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
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civic education on human rights, good governance and fostering collaboration". 156 He
believes that this signifies the Church's commitment to empowering civil society. A
second informant states "apart from the Peace and Justice workshops", 157 operating in
his parish, they also have a group called Amacabean that "is going around to hit a bit
harder on the injustices so to make people aware of their rights". 158 He explains that,
...Amacabean is taken from the book Amacabeus where people fought
for their rights ... we are saying that it's the bible that talks about this, and
it shows that what we are actually doing is the right things that we should
be able to stand for our rights and fight for our rights ...That's the recent
move that we have made in our parish to ensure that people are empowered. 159
A third informant believes that "because there are efforts put into projects in the
villages,,160 such as "putting boreholes and setting up schools, such things are
empowering the people".161 Another informant also believes that the Church is
actively involved in empowering post-Banda civil society. However, he also feels
that,
... the systems of the past has affected the mentality of the people ...
under the current dispensation, the mentality of the people still has not
changed ... it's a long process. The parish council is trying to help the
people understand this new system, but the process of changing people's
mindsets are slow. In other words, the 'culture of silence' is still there. 162
He further adds that this 'culture of silence' is present because " ... sometimes people
speak, but their voices do not get heard, so they wonder if they are really allowed to
speak. But when your voice is heard, you are encouraged to speak".163 Another
informant picks up on this sentiment. "Malawian society is not quite open yet. .. we
don't think our voice has reached to far away from our boundaries". 164 However, 1
informant infers that all hope is not lost; he believes that by building schools and
educating people, "they will be able to think in different ways and that they are going
to start utilizing the resources that they have". 165
156 Interview with informant C: 2 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
157 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
161 Ibid.
162 Interview with informant C: 1 Monday, 22nd July 2002.
163 Ibid.
164 Interview with informant C: 3 Monday, 29th July 2002.
165 Interview with informant C: 4 Saturday, 20th July 2002.
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Findings here indicate that while much good work is being done for and with people
on the ground, mindsets are changing only very slowly. This is not surprising since
thirty years of neo-colonial rule inevitably has affected the way that Malawians
perceive themselves and what they are able to accomplish. Yet at the same time, the
legacy of the past seems also to motivate people to become more open and vocal. As
for the Church itself, it is actively committed to empowering post-Banda civil society.
The examples provided by the informants suggest that efforts are being made to foster
a more active and participatory society, which I believe is a hopeful sign that post-
Banda Malawi has started on the path of liberating itself from the lingering 'neo-
colonial' paradigm and a 'culture of silence'.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION: MALAWI IN THE EARLY YEARS OF
THE 21ST CENTURY
It is the aim of this thesis to examine the progress Malawi has made since regime
change. Thus, the concluding chapter attempts to come to grips with the dialectic of
regime change in Malawi because - in the words of Gros - how can explanations of
political reform ...
. . .be studied in the abstract, devoid, as it were, of geographic space
or locale, time frame and people - in other words, without nation-
states and the actors who help shape how they are governed?
Furthermore, sound social science research requires that
generalizations be made only after the evidence is examined;
theories should always follow investigations, not the other way
around.'
To begin with, Gros argues that there are two phases in the transition to democracy.
"The first phase is sometimes called political liberalisation, wherein leaders of a
country open the political system to competition".2 The second phase depicts a
movement towards embracing democracy. It involves making...
.. .intrastate and state society relations more balanced. Separation of
power, checks and balances, administrative decentralization and
accountability, freedom of speech, press, assembly and the
establishment of a constitution which guarantees a broad range of
civil liberties.3
Malawi is still in a transitional phase "involving a gradual mainly elite-driven
transformation of the formal rules that govern the political system".4 As such, "the
way is open not only for an unchanging government - under formally democratic
conditions - but for a non-accountable government as well".5 Thus, because the
transition to democracy in Malawi is in itself incomplete in many respects, the process
is "neither unilinear nor static: it can move forward, stagnate, or be reversed".6
Furthermore, according to Gros' model, Malawi - arguably - is in phase two of the
transition process. In this view, the 1994 and 1999 elections in Malawi were part of
the process of transition. The 1994 elections led to the empowerment of opposition
1 Gros, J. 'Introduction: Understanding Democratisation', in Gros, J. (ed) (1998) Democratisation in




: Good, K. (2002) The Liberal Model and Africa. Basingstoke: Palgrave, p.19.
Gros, J. (1998) op cif, p.2.
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forces, along with institutions, practices and structures that fundamentally aimed at
strengthening society viz a viz the state. "Considering the situation that prevailed
before the end of the 1980s, there have been some significant changes in the alteration
of political space". 7 For instance, the 1999 elections in Malawi affirmed the
sovereign right of the people of Malawi to choose their president and members of
parliament, and most importantly, continue the stages of the transition process.
Furthermore, distinct are the voices emerging in Malawi, "articulating the universality
of principles, which the leaders of yesteryear might have dismissed as 'un-African",.8
At the height of political changes in Malawi it became apparent that the 1966
constitution of the Republic of Malawi had to be reviewed. The Malawian public was
anxious to institute a constitution that was reflective of the new political dispensation,
which extolled values of transparency, accountability, respect for human rights,
freedom of speech, religion and assembly, established clear roles for various arms of
government, and limited the powers of the president. Establishing a constitution that
guaranteed such visions and needs thus was seen as the foundational means by which
Malawians would free themselves from a repressive past, and a 'culture of silence'.
A number of informants interviewed as part of the research for this dissertation
expressed the opinion that positive changes had taken place since the transition from a
single party regime to a multi-party state. Many informants believe that they now are
free to speak out and express their views in a country where they were once denied
that right. Some, however, are less sure. As indicated in the previous chapter, the
extent to which these constitutionally guaranteed freedoms are enjoyed is debatable!
As Olukoshi warns:
It is not enough, when we assess political development in Africa as
part of our study of the transition process, simply to say that the actions
of government are in accordance with the constitution and the law, since
the constitution and the law can themselves become instruments of
exclusion and oppression.9
7 Olukoshi, A. 'State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa: The Complex Process of Renewal', in Joseph,
R. (ed) (1999) State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
p.456.
8 Gros, 1. (1998) op cit, p.2.
9 Olukoshi, A. op cif, p.456.
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Having noted Olukoshi's warning, I argue that while theory sets the parameters of
research, and clarifies issues of definition, thus enabling an estimation of the extent, if
any, to which a particular country has or has not democratised on the basis of virtues
extolled by the liberal democratic model "where everything revolves around the act of
voting in periodic election", 10 it is important to note that democracy is not only about
voting once every five years. It is also about the ability of ordinary people to influence
their government, to ensure that it is responsive to their needs. 11
More importantly, as scholars and students of political and social science, we should
be "mindful not to assume that the only applicable yardstick against which the
African democratic model can be measured is what is loosely referred to as Western
democracy". 12 Quite apart from the Eurocentrism inherent in such as approach, as
Mamdani and others have cautioned: "it is crucial not to take this to mean that the
African reality can only be interpreted through one-sided recourse to analogies drawn
from histories of other parts of the world". 13
In fact, in Malawi, civil society arguably may be regarded as the most useful tool for
measuring the extent of political transformation. The interviews in this dissertation
involve representatives from civil society organizations, civic, academic and religious
communities. Transcripts indicate an increasing realization that in order to tackle the
root causes of poverty, social injustice and marginalization, civil society organizations
must help people articulate their visions of the future and develop forms of
government that give all parts of the population a stake in the development of the
country. Although many can and do argue that civil society organizations in Malawi
are a fairly recent phenomenon, this does not mean that their activities in the process
of achieving meaningful change are inconsiderable. In fact, since 1994, there has
been a significant increase in the number of civil society organizations and NGOs.
An informant from the umbrella organization, CONGOMA, stated that there are 250
registered NGOs in Malawi. 14 Their foci are variable. However, their common
10 Good, K. (2002) op cit, p.xiii.
:~ Budlender, G. 'A paper dog with real teeth'. Mail & Guardian, July 12-18, 2002, p.17.
Olukoshi, A. op cit, p.457.
13 Ibid, p.463.
14 See appendix for interview with informant E: 1.
113
objective (whether developmental, or providing social services) is to constantly
pressurise government to respond to the demands of the 'voices from below'.
Furthermore, the academic community was asked to shed some OpInIOn on the
concepts of 'voice' and 'space' in order to examine the extent to which, if any,
'voices from below' are impacting and influencing the course of politics in Malawi.
However, what emerged from the transcripts indicates that the idea of 'space'
contains nuances and ambiguities, and that it is technically difficult to establish finite
distinctions between whose voices occupy particular spaces in the public arena. Yet,
the responses also suggest that even though the ruling party occupies much of the
space available in the public arena, some measure of participation from civil society
organizations is tolerated and appreciated. Arguable, this is a hopeful sign.
Furthermore, the dedication of most civic associations such as the ones interviewed
for this dissertation indicate that although there may not yet be a 'clamour of voices'
in the public arena, civil society organizations have strongly committed themselves
towards promoting the interests of the ordinary Malawian.
Thus to conclude, by utilizing the rights vested in the constitution, representatives of
civil society organizations, such as those interviewed, indicate a strong commitment
to a gradual process of dismantling the 'culture of silence' which is an important part
in continuing the process of change. Their objectives are to work towards providing
social justice, gender equality and popular expressivity. Without a doubt, small but
important victories are being won, even if slowly and without fanfare. As such, it has
been the aim of this thesis to explain and examine pertinent aspects and details of the
neo-colonial paradigm in order to illustrate on behalf of Malawian people that "those
who judge us ...would do well to remember the depths from which we have come". 15
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